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1. INTRODUCTION 
This Article makes two novel claims, one normative and one 
descriptive.  The normative claim is that the international 
community should recognize as new states entities claiming 
independence from their parent states if doing so would serve as 
an effective sanction for human rights abuses committed by the 
parent state, even if there is no connection between the secessionist 
entity and the bad behavior of the parent state (“the sanction 
theory of recognition”).  The descriptive claim is that the 
international community’s recognition decisions, while not 
expressed in terms of the sanction theory of recognition, are 
becoming increasingly driven by it. 
Secession, recognition, and the creation of new states is an issue 
of enormous practical significance; in addition to the almost 150 
states that came into existence in the twentieth century, numerous 
entities and movements seek independence today.1  While some 
movements can be dismissed as fantastic, like the current 
movement for an independent Vermont and similar movements in 
other states,2 many secessionist entities, like Chechnya, Darfur, 
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1 See Bruno Coppieters, Introduction, in CONTEXTUALIZING SECESSION: 
NORMATIVE STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 1 (Bruno Coppieters & Richard 
Sakwa eds., 2003) (discussing modern secession crises). 
2 See Ian Baldwin & Frank Bryan, The Once and Future Republic of Vermont, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2007, at B1. (discussing the movement for Vermont’s 
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Tibet, Kosovo, Taiwan, Somaliland, and others present extremely 
difficult situations and complex theoretical and practical questions.  
A secessionist entity’s quest for independence, of course, concerns 
not only the secessionist entity itself, but also the parent state from 
which it seeks independence:  if the secessionist entity is 
successful, the parent state suffers a blow to its territorial integrity 
and loses control over the entity’s territory, population, and 
resources.  The question of secession is a high-stakes contest in 
which there are winners and losers.  And as with any such contest, 
determining who wins and who loses will rarely be a simple task. 
Much of that complicated determination, declaring either the 
secessionist entity or its parent state the winner or the loser, falls to 
other states in the international community.  For secessionist 
entities to become full-fledged states with all the accordant 
benefits, they must be recognized as states for one of two reasons:  
either because recognition is an essential precondition for 
statehood or, more practically, because it is only with recognition 
that new states actually realize the benefits of statehood.  Under 
international law, other states decide whether or not to recognize 
secessionist entities as new states.  The question, then, is:  how 
should states decide whether or not to recognize a secessionist 
entity as a new state? 
Traditional answers to this question have focused on the 
intrinsic merits of the secessionist entity.  The simplest answers 
specify certain requirements of statehood, and suggest that 
recognition should be granted to all secessionist entities that meet 
those requirements.  Others have supplemented the requirements 
of statehood with additional requirements, usually related to some 
international ideological norm:  that is, secessionist entities should 
be recognized as states if they meet the requirements of statehood 
and have democratic institutions, or promote self-determination, or 
do not have illegal origins, or meet some other criterion. 
These proposals are flawed for two primary reasons, both 
caused by their inattention to the parent states implicated in 
recognition decisions.  First, they fail to take account of the 
interests of the parent state, which has an enormous stake in 
whether or not the secessionist entity is recognized as a new state 
and thereby removed from the parent state’s control.  These 
theories do not provide sufficient justification for the violation of 
the parent state’s territorial integrity that is inherent in recognizing 
the secessionist entity as a new state.  Similarly, because parent 
states are so interested in the outcome of recognition decisions, the 
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international community’s strategy for recognition decisions can be 
used to influence the behavior of states.  These theories, by 
ignoring the parent state, squander a vital opportunity for the 
international community. 
Focusing on human rights abuses committed by the parent 
state takes advantage of this opportunity for influence while also 
providing a justification for damaging the interests of the parent 
state.  While the international community has many interests it 
might like to advance through its recognition decisions, focusing 
on human rights abuses has much to recommend it.  Certainly, 
deterring human rights abuses qualifies as an important interest of 
the international community; and the international community has 
very few tools to use in its efforts to deter such abuses.  Critically, 
while other interests might also be worth promoting, focusing on 
the human rights abuses of the parent state provides the 
international community with a justification for damaging the 
interests of the parent state and violating its territorial integrity 
through recognition of a secessionist entity within its borders:  the 
international community is not just advancing its own selfish 
interests at the expense of the parent state, but the parent state, 
through its criminal acts, has forfeited its right to respect for its 
interests, including its territorial integrity. 
Picking up on these notions, “just cause” and “just cause plus” 
theories of recognition merge the question of human rights into the 
intrinsic merits of the secessionist entity:  they require that a 
secessionist entity have suffered human rights abuses at the hands 
of its parent state before a secessionist entity can be recognized as a 
new state.  While these theories of recognition deter certain human 
rights abuses and provide a justification for damaging the interests 
of the parent state, they are inherently limited because they 
approach recognition as a question of the intrinsic merits of the 
secessionist entity, and thus require a nexus between the human 
rights abuses of the parent state and the secessionist entity. 
The sanction theory of recognition removes this nexus 
requirement, and shifts the approach to recognition from an 
evaluation of the intrinsic merits of the secessionist entity, the 
focus of other theories of recognition, to a consideration of extrinsic 
concerns:  it uses recognition as a tool to deter human rights abuses 
generally.  Simply put, the sanction theory advocates recognition 
for secessionist entities when granting them recognition would 
serve as an effective sanction for human rights abuses committed 
by the parent state, whether or not those abuses are in any way 
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related to the secessionist entity, and so long as recognizing the 
secessionist entity will not make the world worse off.  The sanction 
theory of recognition thus realizes the full potential of recognition 
decisions for the international community:  it transforms them into 
a tool for combating human rights abuses, regardless of whether 
the abuses are committed against secessionist entities or not. 
This is not to say that, at times, states cannot recognize 
secessionist entities based on some analysis of their intrinsic merits.  
The sanction theory simply argues that when a parent state is 
committing human rights abuses somewhere in its territory, and 
recognizing a secessionist entity within that parent state would 
serve as an effective sanction for that behavior, while not making 
the world worse off, the extrinsic concerns of stopping such 
behavior override any intrinsic concerns that might be taken into 
account in other situations. 
Importantly, because the sanction theory grounds recognition 
decisions in human rights abuses by the parent state, and because 
international law has accepted that states have enormous 
discretion in their recognition decisions, the sanction theory of 
recognition fits reasonably well within the confines of existing 
international law and practice.  Furthermore, recent recognition 
decisions by the international community seem to be driven, at 
least in part, by the same considerations that underlie the sanction 
theory of recognition. 
Section 2 of this paper outlines the “just cause” and “just cause 
plus” theories of recognition and the sanction theory of recognition 
in greater depth, to make the contours of the sanction theory 
evident and illustrate the great distance between it and these 
previously proposed theories.  Section 3 continues to explore the 
sanction theory by outlining its place within the context of current 
law, thinking, and practice on statehood and recognition.  Section 4 
analyzes the cases of Kosovo, Somaliland, and Chechnya, arguing 
that the recognition decisions in those cases can best be explained 
by the intuitive, if unstated and perhaps unconscious, application 
of the sanction theory by the international community. 
2. RECOGNITION AS RIGHT; RECOGNITION AS SANCTION 
“Just cause” theories, popularized by Allen Buchanan, are not 
necessarily theories of recognition; they arise in the context of the 
right to secede, and suggest that an entity has a right to make a 
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secessionist attempt if it has “just cause.”3  Under these theories, a 
secessionist entity, as “a remedy of last resort,” has a right to 
secede “[i]f the [parent] state persists in certain serious injustices 
toward” the secessionist entity.4  If we assume that a state with a 
just cause to secede has a right to be recognized, we are left with a 
theory that recommends recognition for any secessionist entity that 
has suffered sufficient and continuing abuse at the hands of its 
parent state.5 
Theories, of course, may reject this assumption, and argue that 
even if an entity has a right to secede, it may not have a right to 
recognition, a position Buchanan, himself, adopts.6 Buchanan’s 
theory of recognition builds upon the just cause theory, requiring 
entities not only to have a just cause for secession but also to meet 
other criteria in order to be recognized, a “just cause plus” theory.  
While Buchanan thinks that an entity has a right to attempt to 
secede if it has a just cause, a just cause “by itself does not imply 
that the new entity ought to be recognized as a legitimate state in 
international law.”7  Specifically, Buchanan asserts that 
recognition: 
should depend upon whether the group provides credible 
commitments to satisfying the appropriate normative 
criteria for recognition of new entities as legitimate states, 
in particular whether its constitution and other relevant 
documents . . . evidence a clear commitment to equal rights 
for all within their borders, including ethno-national 
minorities.8 
That is, secessionist entities that have a just cause to secede, 
based on bad acts by their parent state, and that also “make 
credible commitments to internal and external justice” should be 
recognized.9  Similarly, NedZad Basic has argued: 
 
3 ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL 
FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 207 (2003). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 208. 
9 Id. at 244. 
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The international community will assess the policies and 
actions of [the parent state and the secessionist entity] 
against their respect for human rights.  It will allow 
secession if the central government fails to respect human 
rights, peace, and development [within the secessionist 
entity].  Similarly, the group seeking self-determination 
must not use force and must not violate human rights; 
otherwise, the international community will respect the 
state’s territorial integrity against the group’s desire to 
secede.  Assessment against a human rights standard 
produces competition between the parties to outperform 
the other.10 
For Basic, recognition decisions should hinge on the parent 
state and the secessionist entity’s behavior during the conflict 
between the two. 
While these theories relate the recognition decision in some 
way to the behavior of the parent state, they, like all other 
previously proposed theories of recognition, keep their focus on 
the secessionist entity.  Both are framed in “rights talk”:  under 
“just cause” theories, secessionist entities have a right to be 
recognized because they have been abused, while under “just 
cause plus” theories, secessionist entities have a right to be 
recognized because, in addition to being abused, they are 
committed to being “good” states.  Unlike previously proposed 
theories of recognition, the sanction theory of recognition 
abandons this “rights talk” and conceptualizes recognition as one 
tool in the international community’s toolbox for stopping 
international crime, specifically the abuse of human rights, as a 
measure of last resort when other tools, like economic and political 
sanctions, fail. 
The essential theoretical notion behind the proposal of the 
sanction theory is to shift the focus of the recognition decision from 
the entity claiming independence to the state from which 
independence is sought.  The sanction theory thus comports more 
with the reality of the situation:  the parent state is at least as 
affected by the recognition decision as the secessionist entity is, 
given that the parent state loses a significant portion of its 
resources, population, and territory if recognition is granted.  The 
 
10 NedZad Basic, International Law and Security Dilemmas in Multiethnic States, 
8 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 32 (2002). 
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sanction theory also greatly increases the mechanisms available to 
the international community to enforce human rights norms; by 
transforming recognition decisions into a means to stop human 
rights abuses, it captures significant utility that current theories 
waste. 
Under the sanction theory of recognition, recognition decisions 
are used as sanctions.  The shift in focus is somewhat akin to a 
similar shift in focus that has occurred in criminal sentencing law, 
at least in the United States.  While sentencing law has remained 
focused on the offender, theories of sentencing have shifted from a 
notion that the sentence should serve to rehabilitate the offender to 
sentences designed to accomplish primarily four purposes: 
punishing an offender for his crime, deterring the offender from 
committing future crimes (specific deterrence), deterring others 
from committing crimes (general deterrence), and incapacitating 
the offender through incarceration, thereby preventing the 
offender from committing other crimes.11  Under the sanction 
theory of recognition, recognition decisions are understood as a 
tool to promote these same ends, replacing everyday criminals 
with criminal states and everyday crimes with human rights abuse; 
that is, recognition decisions should be made based on signaling 
the international community’s moral outrage at the parent state’s 
human rights abuses, deterring the parent state from committing 
human rights abuses, deterring all states from committing such 
abuses for fear that they, too, will have a secessionist movement 
recognized within their territory, and physically disabling the 
parent state from committing human rights abuses at least within 
the area of a secessionist entity, by removing the entity from the 
control of the parent state.  As sanctions in the international 
community are primarily justified by their ability to make the 
international community a better place, with fewer human rights 
abuses, the most important of these goals is deterrence in the 
general sense.  Thus under the sanction theory of recognition, a 
new entity should be recognized as a state when recognition would 
serve to fulfill these purposes, particularly general deterrence, and 
need not be recognized as a state when recognition would not do 
so. 
 
11 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A 
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts about the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1, 9–11 (2003) (describing the shift in purposes in the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(2) (1985) (laying out the purposes of U.S. sentencing law). 
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Recognition of secessionist entities has the potential to be a 
sanction against the parent state because it is bad for the parent 
state:  not only are sanctions qua sanctions bad for the parent state 
because they hurt the state’s international reputation by signaling 
that the state has been judged by the international community to 
be a bad actor, but the sanction is also (and primarily) bad for the 
parent state for very practical reasons:  the parent state is losing its 
legal control over the territory of the newly recognized state, and 
the people and resources it encompasses.  Because recognition of a 
secessionist entity is bad for the parent state, a rational government 
in charge of the state will seek to avoid it; the state should be 
willing to change its behavior in the face of a plausible threat of 
recognition.  Thus, recognition is theoretically suitable for use as a 
sanction. 
Furthermore, the simple act of recognition is costless, requiring 
nothing more from the recognizing state than a statement.  Of 
course, to achieve fully the removal of the secessionist entity from 
the parent state’s control, other sanctions and potentially armed 
intervention may be necessary.  But recognizing the secessionist 
entity has power of its own:  empirical evidence suggests that 
recognition fortifies “the security of a community,” and thus is 
independently helpful in removing the territory from the control of 
the parent state.12  For instance, the security of the former Yugoslav 
republics of Slovenia and Croatia were significantly increased 
through recognition.13  Recognition can give the secessionist entity 
numerous benefits that increase its chance of survival, and thus the 
effective loss of the territory for the parent state.  These benefits 
include “greater ability to provide for the welfare of the 
population . . . ; a reduction of the risk of external intervention; the 
possibility of entering into treaty relationships with other states; 
more settled borders; expanded opportunities for trade; enhanced 
domestic legitimacy; . . . and other benefits.”14  The bare act of 
recognition seems to help the secessionist entity actually free itself 
 
12 THOMAS D. GRANT, THE RECOGNITION OF STATES: LAW AND PRACTICE IN 
DEBATE AND EVOLUTION 27 (1999) (“Empirical evidence has been adduced which 
suggests unrecognized entities lie in greater jeopardy of extinguishment than full-
fledged states.”). 
13 Id. at 29. 
14 Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Statehood and the Third Geneva Convention, 
46 VA. J. INT’L L. 131, 158 (2005).  See also Coppieters, supra note 1, at 17 (discussing 
the benefits of recognition). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss2/5
2009] RECOGNITION AS SANCTION 539 
 
from the parent state, and thus remove territory, people, and 
resources from the parent state.15 
In a somewhat circular fashion, recognition also changes the 
legal framework of the interactions between the parent state, the 
secessionist entity, and other states.  It enables the secessionist 
entity to seek the benefits of the international system, including 
military and economic aid.  Recognition allows the new state to 
seek admission into the United Nations16 and to secure aid from 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.17  Support 
from these institutions, achieved only after recognition, 
undoubtedly aids the continued existence and security of the new 
state, and secures its removal from the control of the parent state.  
Finally, recognition as a new state frees other states in the 
international community to send military assistance to secure the 
newfound territorial integrity of the recognized state.  Even if 
military assistance is not actually sent, recognition makes it easier 
for the international community to threaten such action, making it 
more likely that the parent state will not resist the newly 
recognized state’s independence.  Given the potential negative 
consequences of recognition for the parent state, it can serve 
effectively as a sanction for the parent state’s bad behavior. 
As a theory of sanction and deterrence, the sanction theory 
focuses predominantly on the parent state:  primarily, whether the 
parent state should be sanctioned and secondarily, whether such 
sanctions would be efficacious.  A parent state should be 
sanctioned if its behavior is the type of behavior that the 
international community wants to deter, and if the imposition of 
the sanction will effectively signal that such behavior will be 
followed with a similar sanction in the future.  As the typical target 
for international sanctions, and the type of behavior the 
international community most wants to deter, human rights abuses 
are the target of the sanction theory.  When the abuses are 
sufficiently grave, recognition of a secessionist entity should be 
threatened to deter the parent state’s continuation of its human 
 
15 ALEKSANDAR PAVKOVIC & PETER RADAN, CREATING NEW STATES: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF SECESSION 11 (2007). 
16 Id. 
17 See About the IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2009) (describing its members as “countries”); About Us: Member 
Countries, http://go.worldbank.org/F3SMXIS5K0 (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) 
(describing its members as “countries”). 
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rights abuses and, failing that, recognition should be granted to 
deter the parent state and other states from committing similar 
abuses in the future. 
By shifting the focus of the recognition decision from the 
secessionist entity to the parent state, from “rights talk” to 
sanctions, the sanction theory eliminates any requirement of a 
nexus between the secessionist entity and the bad behavior of the 
parent state, a requirement inherent in “just cause” and “just cause 
plus” theories.  Under the sanction theory, the parent state need 
only engage in the type of behavior that the international 
community wants to deter; the behavior need not be related to the 
secessionist entity.  This critical difference between the sanction 
theory and other theories of recognition can be seen by comparing 
two hypothetical situations:  suppose secessionist entity B desires 
independence from parent state A.  If A is abusing human rights in 
B, a “just cause” theory will generally recommend recognition of B; 
similarly, the sanction theory will also recommend recognition of B 
if doing so would serve as an effective sanction against A.  But 
suppose A is not abusing human rights in B, but is instead abusing 
the human rights of a religious group, C, that is widely dispersed 
throughout the territory of A, or even concentrated in some other 
part of A, completely separate from B.  “Just cause” theories of 
recognition will not recommend recognition for B; B has not earned 
a right to secede or to be recognized.  But as long as threatening 
recognition of B will deter A from abusing the human rights of C, 
or would deter other states in similar situations from abusing the 
rights of groups in their states, the sanction theory of recognition 
would recommend threatening recognition of B and eventually 
recognizing B if A fails to improve its behavior. 
To take a more concrete example, consider the situation in 
Sudan.  The government in Khartoum has committed serious 
human rights abuses against the people of the Darfur region.18  
Simultaneously, Southern Sudan, governed by the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement, has at times expressed a desire to become an 
independent country.19  While Sudan has certainly violated human 
 
18 See Q&A: Sudan’s Darfur Conflict, BBC NEWS, Aug. 27, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3496731.stm (noting that over 2.7 million 
Darfur civilians have fled to camps where they are subject to rape and murder by 
patrolling Janjaweed militia). 
19 See Glenn Kessler, Sudan’s Peace Deal, Seen as a Bush Success, is Endangered, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2007, at A18 (reporting that an administration official 
acknowledged that Southern Sudan is moving towards independence). 
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rights in Southern Sudan in the recent past,20 and while its current 
treatment of Southern Sudan should not be taken as a model for 
good governance,21 Sudan’s current treatment of Southern Sudan 
would likely not be considered sufficiently abusive to justify 
recognition under “just cause” theories.  Under “just cause” 
theories, the only recognition-related concern for Sudan in regards 
to its treatment of Darfur is recognition of Darfur, itself.  This may 
be complicated by the specific facts of the situation, or, under “just 
cause plus” theories, by the behavior of Darfur itself.  The sanction 
theory of recognition, however, would allow the international 
community to threaten to, and eventually recognize, Southern 
Sudan if Sudan did not reform its behavior in Darfur.  Recognition, 
when approached according to the sanction theory, thus provides 
the international community with a tool to combat human rights 
abuses that is unavailable under other recognition theories. 
Even assuming that the international community could 
recognize Darfur under the “just cause” and “just cause plus” 
theories, by eliminating the nexus requirement, the sanction theory 
would allow the international community more flexibility and a 
more powerful tool to combat Sudan’s behavior.  On a basic level, 
recognition of Southern Sudan might be more practical, as 
independence might be more effectively achieved for Southern 
Sudan than for Darfur.  Further, recognition of Southern Sudan 
might be a better deterrent to Sudan’s behavior in Darfur than the 
recognition of Darfur, itself; given the resource wealth in Southern 
Sudan, there is good reason to believe this is the case.22  Finally, the 
power and effect of the sanction could be ratcheted up under the 
sanction theory:  the international community could threaten to 
and eventually recognize first one and then the other secessionist 
entity within Sudan, providing an even more powerful incentive 
for Sudan to reform its bad behavior. 
Because there is no requirement of a nexus between the bad 
behavior of the parent state and the secessionist entity, the sanction 
 
20 See Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Oil Companies Complicit in Rights Abuses, 
Nov. 24, 2003, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/11/25/sudan6528.htm 
(reporting the Sudanese government’s use of looting, murder, and relief 
prevention to drive thousands of farmers from oil-rich lands in Southern Sudan). 
21 See Kessler, supra note 19 (discussing the potential erosion of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement as the Khartoum government has exhibited 
increasing unwillingness to abide by its terms). 
22 See id. (examining the tension over sharing oil wealth and the conflict 
between the north and south over Abyei, a region with a large oil field). 
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theory deters all manner of human rights abuses, and not simply 
those committed against secessionist entities.  This allows 
recognition to be a more useful sanction.  If a nexus is required, 
while states may be deterred from committing human rights 
abuses against secessionist entities, they will still be capable of 
abusing with impunity the human rights of the general population, 
of a widely dispersed minority group, or of a particular region’s 
population if, for some reason, that group is not a viable or 
acceptable candidate for recognition.  With the nexus requirement 
eliminated, as long as a viable and acceptable secessionist entity 
exists within the parent state, the threat of recognition of that 
secessionist entity can serve to deter the parent state from abusing 
the human rights of any group throughout its territory. 
Of course, in practice there will likely be significant overlap 
between the secessionist entity seeking recognition and the human 
rights abuses of the parent state.  It is unsurprising that human 
rights violations against a particular group would lead to that 
group forming a secessionist movement; or that, faced with the 
threat of a secessionist movement, the parent state might respond 
in a fashion that violates the secessionist group’s human rights.  
Since human rights violations will often be tied to secessionist 
movements on their own, the sanction theory of recognition will 
frequently involve recognition of the very secessionist entity that 
has been the subject of the human rights abuse; but under the 
sanction theory, this need not be the case. 
There are added benefits to having the subject of recognition be 
a secessionist entity in which the human rights abuse has occurred.  
If the abuse has occurred within the secessionist entity, then the 
recognition and separation of the secessionist entity can serve to 
physically block the parent state from continuing its abuse by 
removing the secessionist entity from its control, much like the 
sentencing goal of incapacitation.23  This, however, is merely an 
additional consideration to be taken into account when making 
recognition decisions, and need not be present.  It will often be 
outweighed by the other, more primary goals of the sanction, 
general and specific deterrence.  For instance, in the case of Sudan, 
 
23 See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 11 (discussing the popular concept of 
“selective incapacitation,” which provides for long-term confinement of those 
believed to be responsible for a disproportionate share of crime); 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(2)(C) (1985) (listing “protect[ion of] the public from further crimes of the 
defendant” as a central purpose of U.S. sentencing law). 
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threatening to and recognizing Southern Sudan may be a better 
sanction than threatening to and recognizing Darfur.  The chance 
that Darfur can be removed from the control of Sudan may be 
outweighed by the greater deterrence that the loss of the territory 
and natural resources of Southern Sudan would provide. 
In certain circumstances, however, a sanction of recognition 
would be ineffective, and therefore inappropriate, despite the bad 
behavior of a parent state and the presence of a viable and 
acceptable secessionist entity.  This may occur either because the 
parent state cannot be deterred or because the international 
community will not perceive the sanction as generally applicable.  
Even if specific and general deterrence do not justify the sanction, 
other considerations may, such as the punitive expression of moral 
outrage or the incapacitation of the parent state in regards to the 
secessionist entity.  These considerations may also fail in certain 
circumstances, such as where the international community and the 
secessionist entity will be unable to contain the parent state.  In 
cases where the recognition decision would not fulfill its purposes 
or where the results of the recognition decision would be, on the 
whole, worse for the international community, recognition, like 
other sanctions, would be inappropriate.24 
For instance, if the parent state is extremely strong and 
militarily aggressive in general, it is possible that recognizing the 
secessionist entity will have no actual effect other than to anger the 
parent state and pull the international community into a war that it 
cannot win.  In such cases, even if the secessionist entity is 
somewhat strong, the parent state could simply ignore the 
recognition decision, use its strength to conquer the secessionist 
entity or bring it better under its control, and continue in its bad 
behavior.  The threat of recognition and the recognition decision 
thus would fail to deter the parent state from its bad behavior and 
would fail to incapacitate the parent state from abusing human 
rights within the secessionist entity.  The decision would also 
reduce the credibility, and thus the general deterrent effect, of such 
threats by the international community in the future.  Finally, in 
cases where the parent state and the secessionist entity are in 
 
24 For further discussion of cases where recognition would not serve the 
purposes, either to deter or incapacitate, of the sanction theory of recognition 
despite human rights abuses, as well as cases where, on the whole, recognition 
would have a severely negative effect on the international community, see infra 
Section 4.3 on the situation in Chechnya and Russia. 
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conflict, the recognition decision might raise the stakes of the 
conflict and, to the degree the international community felt 
compelled to back up its recognition decision, could potentially 
embroil other states or the entire international community in 
military conflict, all with no positive benefits gained.  While the 
“just cause” theory would recommend recognition in this situation 
if the secessionist entity had been the subject of the parent state’s 
abuse, the sanction theory, recognizing the ineffectiveness of the 
recognition decision as a sanction, would not, regardless of 
whether a nexus existed between the parent state’s bad behavior 
and the secessionist entity. 
Similarly, there may be cases where the sanction theory does 
not call for recognition despite the bad behavior of the parent state, 
the presence of a secessionist entity, and a set of circumstances 
where recognition of the secessionist entity would have some 
deterrent effect on the parent state.  As a general matter, just as the 
sanction theory of recognition shifts the focus of the recognition 
decision to the parent state, it simultaneously shifts the focus of the 
recognition decision away from the secessionist entity.  Sanctions 
work best the more readily they are available; the more invariably 
the sanction follows the bad behavior, the more the sanction serves 
to deter such bad behavior and the stronger the incentives of the 
parent state to avoid such bad behavior become.  Thus the sanction 
theory of recognition encourages the international community to 
think very little about the secessionist entity; the more the 
international community analyzes secessionist entities and the 
more it demands from such entities before granting recognition, 
the less frequently the recognition decision can serve as a deterrent 
to bad behavior.  To maximize the availability of the recognition 
decision, and thus of its deterrent effect, it is best if the standards 
for the secessionist entity are kept as low as possible. 
Pushing somewhat in the opposite direction, however, is the 
notion that the product of the recognition decision should not be 
worse than the problem that called for recognition in the first place.  
The justification for a sanction theory of recognition is that it makes 
the world better off: its purpose is to deter bad behavior.  Even if a 
particular recognition decision would successfully deter some bad 
behavior, it would not be justified if, on the whole, the recognition 
decision made the world worse off.  For instance, consider a 
secessionist entity that appears not to have any chance as a viable 
state, and thus appears likely to collapse into a power vacuum 
upon independence.  Taking into account the dangers to human 
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rights and the international community that may result,25 
recognition should not be granted if such negative consequences 
are not justified by the positive consequences of the recognition 
decision’s deterrent effect. 
Similarly, if the international community determines that the 
secessionist entity, upon recognition, would engage in its own 
human rights abuses, recognition should be avoided if the negative 
consequences of such bad behavior would outweigh the positive 
consequences of the deterrent effect of the sanction.  That is, what 
states should demand of the secessionist entity is that its nature 
and its commitments indicate that its existence as a recognized 
state, with the benefits of the deterrent effect of recognition as a 
sanction taken into account, will not make the world worse off 
than had the secessionist entity remained a part of its parent state. 
The nature of these demands further distinguishes the sanction 
theory of recognition from “just cause plus” theories.  Under the 
sanction theory, the level of the demands placed upon the 
secessionist entity depends on the expected effects of the 
recognition decision.  If the parent state’s bad behavior is 
particularly acute, or the deterrent power of recognizing the 
secessionist entity is particularly high, then the sanction theory of 
recognition tolerates recognizing a secessionist entity that is 
comparatively less viable or more badly behaved, so long as the 
benefits of using recognition as a sanction in that instance 
outweigh the negative effects of the recognition decision.  
Conversely, if the parent state’s bad behavior, while worthy of 
sanction, is not particularly acute, or the deterrent power of 
recognizing the secessionist entity is not particularly high, then the 
secessionist entity will have to be more viable and better behaved 
to ensure that the benefits of using recognition as a sanction are not 
outweighed by the negative effects of the recognition decision. 
Under a “just cause plus” theory, on the other hand, the 
requirements for secessionist entities are static.26  Others have 
suggested a requirement that any secessionist entity must meet a 
presumably constant standard of respect for minority rights to be 
 
25 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, The Human Rights Crisis in Somalia, Mar. 30, 
2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/03/30/human-rights-crisis-somalia 
(documenting the human rights abuses and international security problems that 
have arisen in Somalia during its years of state collapse). 
26 See BUCHANAN, supra note 3, at 208 (discussing the growing consensus in 
international law that distributive justice matters). 
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an acceptable candidate for recognition.27  This has the 
consequence of nullifying the power of recognition as a sanction in 
certain circumstances where recognition would make the world 
better off.  For example, if parent state A is committing atrocious 
human rights violations throughout its territory, and secessionist 
entity B falls just below the “just cause plus” theory’s standard for 
recognition, even if threatening to recognize B would perfectly 
deter A’s bad behavior, under the “just cause plus” theory, A 
knows that the international community’s hands are tied; the 
international community cannot recognize B, no matter what A 
does.  Under the sanction theory, the bad behavior or uncertain 
commitments of the secessionist entity give the parent state no 
such license; as long as the positive effects brought about by the 
sanction outweigh the negative effects of recognition, the state can 
be threatened and punished with recognition of the secessionist 
entity.28 
This may result in the recognition of certain secessionist entities 
that are, in and of themselves, bad.  Buchanan worries that 
recognizing badly behaved secessionist entities may make the 
international community “accomplices in injustice.”29  But under 
the sanction theory, while the international community would be, 
in some sense, aiding the injustices committed by the newly 
recognized and bad state, it would do so only to end injustices 
committed by the parent state, and only after determining that, on 
the whole, the benefits outweighed the costs.  While this may be 
problematic in some philosophical sense, the international 
community is only guilty of doing the best it can to make things 
 
27 See GRANT, supra note 12, at 96–98 (discussing the increasingly important 
role of minorities’ rights guarantees in state recognition in the context of the 
changing focus of minorities’ rights; with special emphasis on Russia, Croatia, and 
Slovenia). 
28 In addition to eliminating the requirement of a nexus between the parent 
state’s bad behavior and recognition for the secessionist entity, and basing the 
requirements for the secessionist entity on a sliding scale related to the 
circumstances and behavior of the parent state, the sanction theory also leads us 
to talk about recognition in different terms than “just cause” theories. Under the 
sanction theory, we express our thinking by saying, “Parent state A has been bad, 
and so we will recognize secessionist entity B;” under the “just cause” theory, we 
express it through “rights talk,” saying, “Secessionist entity B has been mistreated, 
and so deserves to be recognized as a state.” This dulls the moral condemnation 
that should accompany the recognition decision, moral condemnation that, under 
the sanction theory, should theoretically influence players in the international 
community to avoid abusing human rights. 
29 BUCHANAN, supra note 3, at 167–68. 
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better.  Thus the international community’s primary sin is 
contributing to an unfortunate reversal of moral luck; in 
attempting to stop one set of human rights abuses, it may lead to 
another, although lesser, set of human rights abuses. 
It should be noted, however, that all tools of international law 
seem to have this same problem: they shift negative consequences 
from an abused population to another, potentially innocent, 
population.  Economic sanctions, for instance, are designed to 
convince governments to go easier on minority groups; but they 
inevitably lead to making the country as a whole poorer, resulting 
in suffering for potentially innocent people.  The international 
community’s squeamishness about affecting moral luck should not 
stop it from adopting a theory of recognition that, on the whole, 
would deter more bad behavior than it would enable. 
In addition to the international community being able to make 
demands of the secessionist entity at the point of recognition 
(including, for instance, demanding a temporary peacekeeping 
presence), once the secessionist entity is recognized, it is subject to 
all of the same sanctions that are available for use against other 
states, including the threat of recognition of a sub-secessionist 
entity as a sanction.  Additionally, to the degree that a “just cause 
plus” theory only demands “credible commitments” to justice,30 it 
gets only that:  credible commitments.  These, like other principles 
of international law to which the secessionist entity has not 
committed, will need to be enforced by the international 
community, just as if no commitments had been made. 
Further cabining this concern is an essential insight into the 
nature of deterrence:  like all sanctions, to the degree that 
recognition works as a deterrent, it need not be implemented in 
fact.  Were the sanction to be completely efficacious, and to deter 
fully all human rights abuses, it would simply never be necessary 
to impose the sanction.  Thus, while the sanction theory of 
deterrence is, on its face, a theory about making recognition 
decisions, to the degree that it is efficacious it requires only that the 
international community threaten to recognize secessionist entities 
as new states and not that the international community ever 
actually recognize them. 
The philosophy behind the sanction theory of recognition is 
straightforward:  recognition should be used like every other tool 
 
30 Id. at 244. 
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of human rights enforcement available to the international 
community:  to sanction bad behavior.  The international 
community has very few tools at its disposal for enforcing human 
rights; by focusing on deterring the bad behavior of the parent 
state and eliminating the requirement of a nexus between the bad 
behavior and the secessionist entity, the sanction theory ensures 
that recognition will be as effective a tool for human rights 
enforcement as possible. 
While the sanction theory of recognition is quite novel in its 
approach to recognition, it fits reasonably well within the confines 
of international law on statehood and recognition, although it 
counsels rejection of certain proposals that have been made in both 
areas.  Section 3 will outline the nature of states and recognition 
generally, as well as previously proposed theories of recognition, 
and place the sanction theory of recognition within the framework 
of currently existing international law, theory, and practice. 
3. SITUATING THE SANCTION THEORY IN THE LAW AND                 
PRACTICE OF RECOGNITION 
3.1. Statehood 
States are the primary building blocks of the international 
community.  While other entities such as non-governmental 
organizations, autonomous units, secessionist movements, and 
international entities like NATO and the U.N. play important roles 
on the international stage, states have “the widest range of rights, 
duties, and legal capacity under the rules of international law.”31  
But what makes an entity a state?  Like sailors to the siren’s song, 
no writer seems able to resist beginning by citing the requirements 
for statehood laid out in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States.32  The Convention requires that the 
entity possess four characteristics:  “(a) a permanent population; 
(b) a defined territory; (c) [a] government; and (d) [the] capacity to 
enter into relations with other states.”33  The Convention has at its 
 
31 M. J. PETERSON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS: LEGAL DOCTRINE AND STATE 
PRACTICE, 1815–1995, 1 (1997). 
32 GRANT, supra note 12, at 6 n.26 (collecting sources). 
33 Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 
[hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. 
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core “concepts of effectiveness and territoriality:”34  the entity must 
have a government that effectively controls an actual territory. 
In addition to its frequent citation in the literature, numerous 
governments have expressed their concepts of statehood in nearly 
identical terms:  the United States Department of State has 
suggested that states must have “effective control over a clearly 
defined territory and population; an organized governmental 
administration of that territory; and a capacity to act effectively to 
conduct foreign relations and to fulfill international obligations.”35  
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States says that “a state is an entity that has a defined territory and 
a permanent population, under the control of its own government, 
and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal 
relations with other such entities.”36  The Restatement notes that 
these requirements are drawn from the Montevideo Convention 
and claims that the requirements are generally accepted in 
international law.37  The Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom 
has made similar pronouncements.38 
The Montevideo requirements, however, despite their frequent 
quotation by intellectuals and politicians alike, are not as firmly 
required by international law as many seem to suggest.  As a 
matter of international law, the “Montevideo definition . . . [i]f it 
was binding at all . . . was binding only on the small number of 
Western Hemisphere states that were party to it.  Though signed at 
Montevideo by nineteen states, the Convention was ratified by 
only five . . . .”39  As a practical matter, numerous entities are or 
have been regarded as states by the international community 
without meeting the Montevideo requirements. 
The requirement of a “permanent population” amounts to very 
little:  states with populations as small as “Andorra, Liechtenstein, 
Nauru, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Tuvalu and many 
 
34 GRANT, supra note 12, at 6. 
35 Id. (quoting Notice, U.S. Dep’t. of State Press Relations Office (Nov. 1, 
1976)). 
36 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
201 (1987). 
37 Id. § 201 cmt. a. 
38 A.V. Lowe & Colin Warbrick, Recognition of States, 41 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
473, 480 (1992) (quoting the Foreign Minister). 
39 Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its 
Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 403, 456 (1999). 
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others” are considered states, despite minimal populations.40  The 
requirement of a “defined territory” is similarly unrestrictive:  
Nauru, for instance, is approximately twenty-one square 
kilometers in area.41  The requirement that the territory be 
“defined” also seems to be overlooked in international practice.  
Albania and Yemen were acknowledged as states “without fully 
delimited or defined boundaries;” The Congo was acknowledged 
as a state even though a significant part, Katanga, “was actively 
engaged in a secessionist attempt;” and Israel, Kuwait, and 
Mauritania have been accepted as states in the face of claims by 
other states to the entirety of their territory.42  As a practical matter, 
in the context of entities attempting to secede, it seems clear that 
any such entity will conceive of itself as having territory, in which 
there will undoubtedly be some population, and thus these first 
two requirements do not appear as if they will ever serve to 
exclude an entity from qualifying as a state. 
The requirement that the entity have a “government” that 
exercises “effective control” also seems to place little actual 
restriction on the practice of the international community.  The 
Congo was acknowledged as a state in the midst of a civil war and 
with “governing structures [that] were completely ineffective for a 
number of years;” the U.N. considered Rwanda and Burundi to be 
states “even though the General Assembly openly acknowledged 
that they did not fulfill the traditional criterion of effective 
government;” Angola was similarly considered a state, despite 
undergoing a civil war “with three competing would-be 
governments all proclaiming their rule.”43 
The international community also acts as if statehood persists 
even when the entity suffers an almost total loss of effective control 
over the territory, such as with Cambodia and Lebanon “during 
their periods of near-total collapse,”44 the continued existence of 
the Baltic states and Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia in the 
minds of the Allies during the Second World War, and Somalia 
today.45  France seems to have regarded Poland and 
 
40 SCOTT PEGG, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE DE FACTO STATE 46 (1998). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 46–47. 
43 Id. at 47. 
44 Id. 
45 Matthew N. Bathon, Note, The Atypical International Status of the Holy See, 
34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 597, 621 (2001); Grant, supra note 39, at 435. 
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Czechoslovakia as states during the First World War as well, even 
though Poland had possessed no territory or effective control for 
100 years and Czechoslovakia had never had either territory or 
effective control.46  More recently, the international community 
almost uniformly acknowledged Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 
state, at a period in time when it had almost no effective control 
over its territory, and when its boundaries, and even its claim to 
any territory whatsoever, were hotly contested by numerous other 
entities.47 
As for engaging in foreign relations, Liechtenstein “remained a 
state after transferring control of its foreign affairs to 
Switzerland . . . .”48  More generally, the Vatican City is widely 
regarded as a state,49 even though it has a population of 
approximately five-hundred people, none of whom are 
permanent,50 its territory is a robust one-hundred and six acres,51 
and it is heavily dependent on Italy for even its most basic 
services.52  On the flip side of the coin, the international community 
has acted as if entities that meet all of these criteria, including 
Somaliland, pre-independence Eritrea, and the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus, among others, were not states.53  Given the laxity 
of these requirements, it seems unlikely that many secessionist 
movements, by definition claiming some territory with some 
population, will fail to meet them, at least to the extent that their 
governments are required to be no more effectively in control or 
capable of conducting foreign relations than states like Somalia and 
occupied Czechoslovakia. 
Despite the fact that numerous states, present and past, at their 
inception and during their continuation, have failed to live up to 
the Montevideo requirements, numerous commentators have 
argued that statehood requires more.  James Crawford has argued 
that independence is a requirement of statehood.54  For 
 
46 Grant, supra note 39, at 436. 
47 Roland Rich, Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union, 4 EUR. J. INT’L  L. 36, 49–51 (1993). 
48 Bathon, supra note 45, at 616. 
49 Id. at 599. 
50 Id. at 609. 
51 Id. at 604. 
52 Id. at 616. 
53 PEGG, supra note 40, at 52. 
54 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979). 
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independence to be distinct from effective control, it must mean 
that the state is capable of standing on its own.  Understood in that 
way, “any number of entities widely agreed to be states might not 
be properly termed as such.”55  The Vatican City is clearly 
dependent on Italy in a sense that makes it non-independent;56 Iraq 
seems currently to maintain itself only through the support of the 
United States and other states;57 and Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
clearly reliant on the support of NATO, the U.N., and numerous 
states at the time that it gained wide acknowledgment as a state.58 
While Crawford and others have also argued for a requirement 
of independence in a sense connected with the entity’s “legality or 
illegality of origin,”59 this requirement seems more properly 
considered as a proposed requirement for recognition than 
statehood, given that an entity that has come into being through 
illegal means operates indistinguishably from one that has come 
into being through legal means, with the exception of how the 
entity might be viewed by the international community, and so it 
will be discussed along with other proposed criteria for recognition 
infra.  Similarly, the proposals made by some critics that entities 
must go through popular referenda on independence to be states,60 
that entities must have democratic governments to be states,61 and 
that entities must respect the rights of minorities to be states62 seem 
clearly to belong to the realm of recognition decisions and not 
definitional statehood.  As such, they will be discussed infra. 
Another proposed criterion for statehood is that the entity must 
make a claim that it is a state.  According to The Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, “[w]hile the 
traditional definition does not formally require it, an entity is not a 
state if it does not claim to be a state.”63  This criterion seems to be 
driven entirely by consideration of the case of Taiwan, which “does 
 
55 Grant, supra note 39, at 438. 
56 Bathon, supra note 45, at 616. 
57 See, e.g., Abigail Hauslohner/Mahmudiya, Iraqi Troops: Asleep on the Job?, 
TIME, Apr. 21, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article 
/0,8599,1732617,00.html (describing Iraq’s dependence on U.S. military aid). 
58 Rich, supra note 47, at 49–51. 
59 PEGG, supra note 40, at 48. 
60 Grant, supra note 39, at 440. 
61 Id. at 442. 
62 Id. at 444. 
63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
201 cmt. f (1987). 
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not claim to be Taiwan, but rather the Republic of China.”64  This 
requirement seems, on its face, to be a rather absurd ad hoc 
addition to the requirements of statehood, added simply to explain 
a singular situation that could be more truthfully explained by 
appeals to the particular reality of that situation.  Taiwan clearly is 
a state insofar as “state” is a descriptive term; it is at least as 
effective as numerous other entities that are acknowledged to be 
states.  The willingness to call Taiwan a non-state as opposed to an 
“unrecognized state” seems simply to be an extension of the 
decision not to recognize Taiwan.  Further highlighting the ad hoc 
nature of this criterion, as far as secessionist movements go, this 
criterion will never come into play; by definition, secessionist 
entities claim to be states, and so this criterion will not serve to 
limit the international community from recognizing secessionist 
movements as states. 
To the degree that statehood is a prerequisite for recognition, 
the sanction theory of recognition would impel us to keep our 
standards for statehood as low as possible.  By keeping the 
standards for statehood low, and, in turn, lowering the bar for 
recognition, recognition would be available more frequently for 
use as a sanction, and thus could serve more effectively as a 
deterrent to human rights abuses.  Given that the requirements of 
territory and population will almost always be satisfied in the 
weak sense in which they are required in practice, they should 
pose no impediment to the efficacy of the sanction theory of 
recognition. 
Similarly, given the low standards set by international practice 
for the requirements of a government with effective control over 
the entity and of a government with the capacity to engage in 
foreign relations, these requirements should not hinder the 
sanction theory of recognition.  Bosnia was granted recognition at a 
time when any effective control its government might have had 
over its territory was completely dependent upon foreign 
support.65  To the degree that a secessionist entity will not be able 
to have anything approaching effective control over any of its 
territory even with significant foreign intervention, recognition of 
the entity will not be able to function as a sanction; the parent state 
should have no trouble reasserting its dominion over the 
 
64 Grant, supra note 39, at 439. 
65 Rich, supra note 47, at 57. 
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secessionist entity, and the recognition will have been in vain.  
Even were that not the case, recognition of such entities would 
likely lead to power vacuums and the human rights abuses that 
tend to follow them, making them inappropriate candidates for 
recognition.66 
For the sanction theory to be most efficacious, the non-
Montevideo requirement of independence (in the sense of not 
requiring external support) should be rejected, so as to make 
recognition more readily available as a sanction.  As this section 
suggests, however, rejecting the requirement of independence and 
keeping the Montevideo requirements easily satisfied—i.e., 
conditions conducive to the most efficacious use of the sanction 
theory of recognition—does not move current practice far, if at all, 
from its current state.  Thus, while the sanction theory pushes for a 
low bar for statehood under international law, current practice has 
already done most of the work on that front. 
3.2. Recognition 
Just as there is room for the sanction theory of recognition 
within the confines of international law and practice on statehood, 
there is room for the sanction theory of recognition within the legal 
framework and practice of recognition.  As a general matter, 
Recognition is a procedure whereby the governments of 
existing states respond to certain changes in the world 
community.  It may also be a means by which existing 
states seek to effect changes in that community . . . . 
Recognition is an authoritative statement issued by 
competent foreign policy decision-makers in a country.  
Through it, those decision-makers signal the willingness of 
their state to treat with a new state or government or to 
accept that consequences, either factual or legal, flow from 
a new situation.67 
In the context of states, recognition of an entity as a state 
signifies that the recognizing state accepts that the recognized 
entity is a state and that the recognizing state will extend to the 
 
66 Cf. Human Rights Watch, The Human Rights Crisis in Somalia, supra note 25 
(chronicling the human rights violations in Somalia after the fall of the 
government). 
67 GRANT, supra note 12, at xix. 
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newly recognized state all of the benefits that come with statehood 
and formal relations.  Recognition is, then, extremely important in 
the context of secessionist entities:  “[h]istorically, international 
recognition of statehood has been the major foreign policy goal of 
any secessionist movement.”68 
Just as no writing on statehood is complete without reference 
to the Montevideo convention, writings on recognition appear to 
be subject to an unwritten rule that they must distinguish the 
constitutive and declaratory theories on the nature of recognition.  
Under the constitutive theory, recognition is essential to being a 
state:  before an entity can be a state, it must be recognized by other 
states.69  Thus, when a state recognizes an entity as a new state, it is 
doing something constructive; it is helping to transform the entity 
from some non-state thing into a state.  Under the declaratory 
theory, recognition is simply “an acknowledgment of statehood 
already achieved.”70  Thus, when a state recognizes an entity as a 
new state, it is not contributing to the transformation of the entity 
into a new state, but simply announcing that it understands that 
the entity has fulfilled the requirements of statehood, and is thus a 
new state. 
While writers tend to understand the difference as significant, 
with declaratory theory belonging to the realm of “legal principle” 
and constitutive theory belonging to the realm of “statecraft,” there 
is enormous play in the joints.71  Before the declaratory theory can 
mean anything, the contours of what it is to be a state must be 
firmly established.  As discussed above, the requirements of 
statehood are of dubious legal validity, uncertain, and, in practice, 
not particularly meaningful.  And while some have suggested that, 
under the constitutive theory, the recognition decision “is an act of 
unfettered political will divorced from binding considerations of 
legal principle,”72 this is not necessarily so.  The constitutive 
theory, at its core, simply requires that entities be recognized as 
states to be states; it is, of course, possible that states could make 
these decisions based on “considerations of legal principle.”  
 
68 PAVKOVIC & RADAN, supra note 15, at 11 (q uoting JAMES B. CRAWFORD, THE 
CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 376 (2nd ed. 2007)). 
69 GRANT, supra note 12, at 2. 
70 Id. at 4. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 2 (quoting HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 41 (1948)). 
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Similarly, the declaratory theory need not be entirely devoid of 
political considerations:  if the criteria for statehood are determined 
on the basis of politics, then, in some sense, the declaratory theory 
simply carries forward political decisions under the guise of legal 
reasoning.  Similarly, if determining whether or not states have 
successfully met the legal criteria for statehood is left to individual 
political actors, then politics will likely figure in that decision as 
well.73 
The essential distinction between the two theories comes from 
what seems to be an added-on feature of the two theories.  As 
typically conceptualized, under the constitutive theory, recognition 
decisions are made entirely “at the discretion of the individual 
state” making the decision,74 while under the declaratory model, 
announcements of recognition are considered to be “an automatic 
duty” whenever an entity has fulfilled the requirements of 
statehood.75  The theories do not simply envision a different role 
for recognition decisions in the formation of states, but also a 
different level of freedom for the states making recognition 
decisions. 
The sanction theory of recognition can fit under either the 
declaratory or constitutive theories.  Under the constitutive theory, 
the sanction theory works if states choose to recognize secessionist 
entities as states when doing so would serve as an effective 
sanction for the bad behavior of the parent state; this act of 
recognition would help turn the secessionist entity into a state.  
Under the declaratory theory, the sanction theory works if we 
simply choose to make it a requirement for statehood that coming 
into being as a state serves as an effective sanction for the bad 
behavior of the parent state; the act of recognition would then 
simply acknowledge that the secessionist entity fit the 
requirements of statehood and was a state.  Of course, making the 
fact that a state’s coming into being serves as a sanction against a 
parent state a requirement of statehood is a somewhat strange 
maneuver, but it is not clear why it would be impermissible. 
Some authors have perceived that the debate between the 
declaratory and constitutive theories are outdated, and that, in fact, 
 
73 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 202 reporters’ note 1 (1987) (discussing the two theories of the 
recognition of statehood by other states). 
74 GRANT, supra note 12, at 3. 
75 Id. at 4. 
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“the critical tension in recognition law is concentrated along two 
axes . . . first, along an axis between recognition conceived as legal 
act and recognition conceived as political act; and, second, along an 
axis between a collective and a unilateral process of recognition.”76  
The sanction theory, however, is somewhat indifferent between 
both poles of both axes.  By suggesting that all recognition 
decisions should be made with the effectiveness of the sanction in 
mind, the theory is, in some sense legally oriented: it suggests that 
all decisions should be made uniformly for the same reason: if 
recognition would be an effective sanction, it should be granted.  
Thus, a legal rule could carry out the sanction theory.  However, 
the sanction theory could be carried into effect through political 
action: if states simply willingly embraced the sanction theory as 
their guide to their recognition decisions, and acted on it in all 
cases, the theory would lead to the same recognition decisions as if 
the theory were taken as a legal rule.  Of course, the chances of this 
happening in the real world are somewhat slim, and so the 
sanction theory would likely work better as a legal rule; then again, 
getting states to obey legal rules is easier said than done.  
Additionally, the sanction theory is clearly, in some sense, a 
political rule; it is designed to carry out a specific political 
objective: stopping states from committing human rights abuses.  
On the other hand, this does not disqualify it as a legal rule; most, 
if not all, legal rules are designed to carry out a “political” purpose. 
As for whether recognition is done through a collective or 
unilateral process, the sanction theory is once again somewhat 
indifferent.  If all states act unilaterally, but all according to the 
sanction theory, then the theory would have the same practical 
effects as if recognition decisions were left up to a collective 
process under which recognition decisions were determined 
according to the sanction theory.  As with the legal-political axis, 
the sanction theory would likely be more effective in practice if 
determined through a collective mechanism: the chances of all 
states acting unilaterally in the same way in all instances is slim.  
Then again, collective processes are by definition influenced by 
constituent actors, and so there is no guarantee that even a 
collective process would work perfectly.  The sanction theory is 
also, in some sense, inherently “collective” in nature, in that its 
goal is a collective one: it acts to prevent human rights abuses, 
 
76 Id. at xx. 
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rather than further the ends of one particular state or another.  Of 
course, it could be argued that, in the long run, it is in the interests 
of all states, both from a collective and a singular point of view, to 
prevent human rights abuses on a global scale.  Further, the 
efficacy of the sanction theory is dependent on recognition or non-
recognition being taken by a large number of states; the effects of 
each recognition decision are cumulative on the parent state and 
the secessionist entity.  The sanction theory thus would seem to 
operate most effectively as a legal rule applied through a collective 
process, but could also succeed as a political rule applied through a 
unilateral process, as long as it was accepted widely and followed 
consistently. 
The weight of scholarly opinion seems to come down on the 
side of the declaratory view of recognition, with the constitutive 
theory of recognition being attacked for theoretical and logical 
reasons.77  But these attacks tend to focus on the idea that 
recognition is not essential for statehood, rather than attempting to 
argue that states are under a legal obligation to recognize entities 
as states if they fulfill the criteria for statehood.78  The Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States seems to 
adopt this composite view:  while under Section 201, following the 
Montevideo Convention, an entity is declared to be a state if “it has 
a defined territory and permanent population, under the control of 
its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to 
engage in, formal relations with other such entities,”79 under 
Section 202 it is made clear that “[a] state is not required to accord 
formal recognition to any other state but is required to treat as a 
state an entity meeting the requirements of Section 201.”80 
That is, following the declaratory theory, whether or not an 
entity is a state is entirely independent of whether or not the entity 
has been recognized as a state by other states; but, following the 
constitutive theory, states are not obligated to recognize an entity 
as a state even if the entity has met all of the requirements for 
 
77 See id. at 19–22 (critiquing the constitutive view of recognition as a 
contractual event and highlighting practical disjunctions posed by constitutivism; 
including the proposition that unrecognized communities have no duties under 
international law and the difficulty of reconciling constitutive theory with 
retroactive juridical effect of recognition). 
78 See id. 
79 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
201 (1987). 
80 Id. § 202. 
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statehood.  According to the Reporter’s Notes, this combination 
“tends toward the declaratory view, but the practical differences 
between the two theories have grown smaller . . . . [T]he 
constitutive theory lost most of its significance when it was 
accepted that states had the obligation . . . to treat as a state any 
entity having the characteristics set forth in Section 201.”81  For all 
practical purposes, the freedom of states to grant or deny 
recognition renders the debate between the constitutive and 
declaratory theories of recognition extremely academic.  Whether 
an entity needs recognition to be a state or not, most of the benefits 
of statehood only come when recognition is granted: “an entity 
will fully enjoy the status and benefits of statehood only if a 
significant number of other states consider it to be a state and treat 
it as such, in bilateral relations or by admitting it to major 
international organizations.”82  It is cold comfort to be an 
unrecognized state that knows it’s a state because some theoretical 
requirements have been met.  Until other states recognize the 
entity as a state, it will still be in a significantly inferior position in 
the international community. 
In addition to the Restatement, numerous sources acknowledge 
that recognition decisions are made at the discretion of the 
recognizing government in practice.83  According to the United 
Nations, “[w]hile states may regard it as desirable to follow certain 
legal principles in according or withholding recognition, the 
practice of states shows that the act of recognition is still regarded 
as essentially a political decision, which each state decides in 
accordance with its own free appreciation of the situation.”84  
NATO has indicated that recognition is “entirely a matter for 
individual member states.”85  And, most importantly, given that 
they are the primary players in the recognition game, “most states 
regard recognition as a political act,” made at their discretion.86  
 
81 Id. § 202, n.1. 
82 Id. § 202 cmt. b. 
83 See id. § 202, n.2. 
84 GRANT, supra note 12, at 22 (quoting U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., at 19, U.N. Doc. 
S/1466 (Jan./May 1950)). 
85 Id. at 23 (quoting Letter from N.W.G. Sherwen, Office of Information and 
Press, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to Thomas D. Grant, Senior Research 
Fellow, Cambridge Univ. (Mar. 19, 1996) (on file with Grant)). 
86 PEGG, supra note 40, at 129 (quoting ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: 
THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 148 (1986)). 
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Recent practice seems to carry this notion out, especially 
concerning the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. 
After Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from 
the Yugoslav Federation in June of 1991, fighting broke out.87  After 
attempts to broker peace failed, the European Community came to 
the conclusion that the Yugoslav Federation was in the process of 
dissolution.88  Having given up on keeping the Federation 
together, and believing that multiple states would be emerging 
from its dust and ashes, the European Community determined that 
it needed to come up with criteria for recognizing the entities that 
emerged as states.89  Meeting in December of 1991, the Foreign 
Ministers of the member states of the European Community came 
up with a “Declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of new 
States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.”90 The very title of 
the document indicates that the European Community viewed 
recognition as a discretionary practice, framing it in terms of the 
requirements states had to meet in order to achieve recognition, not 
in terms of what requirements entities had to meet in order to 
become states. 
The content of the document further indicated that the 
European Community neither believed that recognition was 
essential to statehood (as the constitutive theory holds) nor that the 
member states were obligated to recognize entities as states merely 
because they met the requirements for statehood (as the 
declaratory theory holds).  According to the Declaration, “[t]he 
Community and its Member States” were prepared to recognize 
“subject to the normal standards of international practice and the 
political realities in each case, those new States which . . . have 
constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the 
appropriate international obligations, and have committed 
themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to 
negotiations.”91  Not only does this statement explicitly recognize 
that the recognition decisions would be made based on “the 
political realities in each case,” but it also conditioned recognition 
 
87 Lowe & Warbrick, supra note 38, at 475. 
88 Id. at 475–476. 
89 See id. at 476 (noting the importance of protecting minority rights in the 
context of recognition). 
90 Id. at 477. 
91 Id. at 477 (quoting the Declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of new 
States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (hereinafter the Declaration)). 
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on a number of requirements beyond simple statehood:  the 
entities had to be democratically constituted, accept their 
international obligations, and be committed to “a peaceful process 
and to negotiations.”92 
In addition to these three initial criteria beyond statehood, the 
Declaration added numerous other criteria for recognition.  To be 
recognized, states needed to demonstrate their “respect for the 
provisions of the” U.N. Charter and other international law 
documents, “especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy 
and human rights;”93 they needed to provide sufficient “guarantees 
for the rights of . . . ethnic and national groups and minorities”;94 
they needed to “respect . . . the inviolability of all frontiers” and 
acknowledge that they could “only be changed by peaceful means 
and by common agreement;”95 they needed to commit to 
“disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation” as well as “security 
and regional stability;”96 they had to be willing to “settle by 
agreement, including . . . arbitration, all questions concerning State 
succession and regional disputes”;97 finally, there would not be 
recognition for states “which are the result of aggression,” and 
recognition decisions “would take account of the effect of 
recognition on neighbouring States.”98  These additional 
requirements, numerous and independent of the basic notions of 
statehood, made it clear that the European Community viewed 
recognition as a process that could be conditioned quite openly on 
more than simple statehood.99 
Additionally, the European Community imposed specific 
requirements on states emerging from the former Yugoslavia:  
those states had to accept “provisions on human rights suggested 
by the EC Conference on Yugoslavia and the continued work of the 
Conference and . . . the work of the Security Council in 
Yugoslavia.”100  As a last, somewhat unusual requirement, each 
state had to adopt “constitutional and political guarantees ensuring 
 
92 Id. (quoting the Declaration). 
93 Id. (quoting the Declaration). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 478 (quoting the Declaration). 
99 See Rich, supra note 47, at 56–57. 
100 Lowe &Warbrick, supra note 38, at 478. 
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that it has no territorial claim towards a neighboring Community 
State, including the use of language which implies territorial 
claims.”101  The fact that requirements for recognition could be 
crafted specifically for states emerging from Yugoslavia, rather 
than for all entities wishing to be recognized as states, further 
reveals the discretionary and political nature of the recognition 
decision.  The final esoteric requirement, regarding “the use of 
language which implies territorial claims,” “was inserted at the 
insistence of Greece, concerned about possible claims (and even the 
use of the name) by Macedonia which might imply designs on the 
northern Greek province of Macedonia.”102  It seems implausible 
that this linguistic requirement could possibly be a true 
requirement of statehood, and the process through which it was 
inserted further makes clear the discretionary and political nature 
of recognition in the eyes of the European Community. 
Just as the Declaration indicated that recognition was 
independent of statehood, so, too, did the actual practice of 
recognition that ensued.  Entities that wished to be recognized as 
states were to apply to the Badinter Commission, a commission 
specifically set up by the European Community for resolving the 
situation in the former Yugoslavia.103  If the application met with 
the Commission’s approval, based on the guidelines for 
recognition, the European Community and its member states 
would grant the entity recognition.104  If it did not, member states 
were free to choose for themselves whether or not they would 
grant the entity recognition, further indicating the discretionary 
and political nature of the decision.105 
After reviewing the applications of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, 
and Macedonia, the Commission found that Slovenia and 
Macedonia should be recognized, while Croatia and Bosnia should 
not.106  According to the Commission, Croatia’s constitution 
afforded inadequate protection to the minorities within its borders 
 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 See A.V. Lowe & Colin Warbrick, Recognition of States Part 2, 42 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 433, 433 (1993) (discussing how Yugoslavia’s Secretary of State 
awaited Badinter Commission decisions to resolve the Yugoslav crisis); Id. at 433 
& n.3. 
104 Lowe & Warbrick, supra note 38, at 478. 
105 Id. 
106 Lowe & Warbrick, supra note 103, at 434. 
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while Bosnia needed to demonstrate that its people were, in fact, in 
favor of becoming a new state.107  Following the Commission’s 
advice, the European Community and its member states quickly 
recognized Slovenia as a state.108  In response to the Commission’s 
ruling, Bosnia held a referendum on independence.109  Bosnian 
Serbs, more than a third of Bosnia’s population, boycotted the vote, 
but of those who did vote, Bosnian Muslims and Croatians, more 
than ninety-nine percent endorsed independence.110  Following the 
vote, the European Community recognized Bosnia as a state.111 
That was where the European Community stopped following 
the Badinter Commission’s advice. Despite the Commission’s 
recommendation against recognizing Croatia, the European 
Community recognized Croatia as a state, seemingly satisfied with 
Croatia’s promises that it would address the Commission’s 
constitutional concerns in the near future, a promise upon which, 
somewhat unsurprisingly, “Croatia did not immediately 
deliver.”112  Despite having set up a legal-seeming Commission, the 
European Community recognized Croatia despite its 
recommendation, affirming the political and discretionary nature 
of the recognition decision. 
These factors were even more evident in Macedonia’s attempt 
to gain recognition. Despite the Commission’s recommendation, 
the European Community refrained from recognizing Macedonia 
because Greece objected to the use of the name “Macedonia.”113  
Eventually, the European Community came to the conclusion that 
it would recognize Macedonia if it came up with a different name 
that was acceptable to Greece;114 that is, all that stood between 
Macedonia and recognition was Greece’s objection to its name.  
This continued even after Macedonia “amended its constitution to 
meet the Greek concerns and had made internationally legally 
binding statements that Macedonia had no territorial designs 
against Greece.”115 Eventually, despite retaining the name the 
 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 435. 
110 Id.; Rich, supra note 47, at 50. 
111 Lowe & Warbrick, supra note 103, at 435. 
112 Id. at 434. 
113 Id. at 437. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 438. 
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“Republic of Macedonia,” Macedonia was recognized by the 
European Community and admitted to the United Nations, but 
those entities still refer to Macedonia as “the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia,”116 and the name dispute continues to this 
day.117  Thus despite the semi-legal appearance of the recognition 
process in the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the political and 
discretionary nature of the recognition decision, reflecting some 
combination of the declaratory and constitutive theories of 
recognition, was extremely clear:  not only was recognition 
specifically conditioned on meeting numerous requirements 
beyond those for simple statehood, but recognition was granted 
when those conditions were not met, and was withheld when they 
were, specifically over something as petty and clearly political as 
the name of the new state. 
The general law and practice of recognition thus make room for 
the sanction theory of recognition.  While Section 202 of the 
Restatement limits the behavior of states in some way, by requiring 
states to treat as a state any entity that meets the requirements for 
statehood, recognition is left in general to the discretion of 
individual states.118  States are free to choose the standards under 
which they grant recognition (or to choose to have no standards at 
all); thus under international law and practice, they are free to 
choose the sanction theory to structure their recognition decisions. 
3.3. Territorial Integrity 
Recognition decisions, however, are not entirely discretionary; 
the discretion of states and theories of recognition are constrained 
by other international norms, like the principle of territorial 
integrity.  The sanction theory, however, justifies overriding 
territorial integrity because of its basis in advancing human rights, 
a concept that appears to fit reasonably well within current 
international law and practice. 
 
116 See Delegation of the European Union to the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, http://www.delmkd.ec.europa.eu/en/index.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 
2009); United Nations, List of Member States, http://www.un.org/members 
/list.shtml (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (using the disputed name). 
117 See Associated Press, Macedonian Parliament to Debate UN Proposal on 
Ending Name Dispute with Greece, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 28, 2008. 
118 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 
202 (1987). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss2/5
2009] RECOGNITION AS SANCTION 565 
 
According to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States: 
[A]ccepting as a state an entity that seeks to secede from 
another state, but has not yet succeeded in achieving 
complete control of its territory, is an improper interference 
in the internal affairs of the parent state, and if the seceding 
entity is given military support, may constitute the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity of the parent 
state in violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter.119 
In other words, “[p]remature recognition . . . is itself a violation 
of the rights of the ‘parent’ state, and, if accompanied by armed 
support for the rebels, would constitute the use of force against the 
territorial integrity of the parent state contrary to Article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter.”120  States have complete discretion in 
their recognition decisions when the secessionist entity at issue has 
“complete control of its territory,” and can recognize such states 
for the purpose of sanctioning the parent state.  However, states 
are only justified in engaging in “premature” recognition if they 
are warranted in violating the territorial integrity of the parent 
state.  While this imperative may constrain the discretion of states 
under other theories of recognition, it does not affect the sanction 
theory.  The sanction theory only requires “premature recognition” 
(and any recognition at all, for that matter) when the parent state 
has been engaging in human rights abuses.  Such abuses justify 
overriding the territorial integrity of the parent state through 
“premature” recognition. 
The sanction theory operates unconstrained by territorial 
integrity if one of two conditions is true: either there is, in fact, no 
prohibition in international law and practice against “premature” 
recognition, or international law and practice reflect the notion that 
human rights abuses justify “premature” recognition.  The widely 
accepted recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and 
particularly Bosnia suggests that at least one of these conditions is 
true. 
 
119 Id. § 202 cmt. f. 
120 Id. § 202, n.4. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
566 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:2 
 
When Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence, the 
Federal Government of Yugoslavia rejected their claims.121  Their 
recognition as independent states by the international community 
was certainly not accepted as legitimate by Yugoslavia.  In fact, the 
federal government protested the recognition as “contrary to the 
sovereign rights of Yugoslavia which proceed from international, 
contemporary legal documents,”122 although it eventually accepted 
the independence of Slovenia.123  For Croatia and Bosnia, 
recognition not only came without the consent of the parent state, 
but it also came at a time when neither state had “yet succeeded in 
achieving complete control of its territory . . . .”124  At the time of 
Croatia’s recognition, the federal army was in the middle of 
Croatia and actively fighting with the Croatian army.125  The 
government of Croatia had no control over more than a third of its 
territory.126  Not long after recognition was granted, the U.N. felt it 
necessary to constitute a peacekeeping force, UNPROFOR, to help 
end the fighting in Croatia.127  Given the necessity for a 
peacekeeping force and the fact that the parent state’s military was 
still at least partially in control of some of Croatia’s territory, it is 
hard to claim that the Croatian government had met a robust 
version of the Montevideo Convention’s “effective control” 
requirement for statehood, let alone the Restatement’s “complete 
control” requirement for non-premature recognition. 
The recognition of Bosnia stands out as an even more extreme 
example of widely accepted “premature” recognition.  In fact, the 
Yugoslav federal government specifically condemned it as such.128  
Following the vote for independence, there was widespread inter-
ethnic fighting in Bosnia.129  During this period, the Yugoslav 
National Army had “a substantial presence” on the ground in 
 
121 Lowe & Warbrick, supra note 38, at 475 (“These assertions of statehood 
were not acquiesced in by the Federal authorities, nor have they been formally 
accepted by them since.”). 
122 Id. at 479 (quoting INDEPENDENT, Jan. 16, 1992, at 8). 
123 Rich, supra note 47, at 49 (discussing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s 
decision on August 13, 1992 to extend recognition to Slovenia). 
124 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 
202, cmt. f (1987). 
125 Warbrick, supra note 103, at 435. 
126 Rich, supra note 47, at 56. 
127 Warbrick, supra note 103, at 435. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
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Bosnia.130  International forces, in the form of UNPROFOR, were 
also present.131  At the time of recognition, the government had “no 
effective control over any areas including the capital city . . . .”132  
Not long after recognition, the President of Bosnia went so far as to 
say that Bosnia “could not protect its independence without 
foreign military aid.”133 
The Yugoslav federal government maintained that these facts 
proved that the recognition of Bosnia violated international law.  In 
1993, Bosnia filed an application with the International Court of 
Justice with the hope of bringing proceedings against the federal 
government of Yugoslavia.  Bosnia accused Yugoslavia of 
“genocide, conspiracy and incitement to commit genocide, 
complicity in genocide, and a failure to prevent and punish 
genocide.”134  In objecting to Bosnia’s application, Yugoslavia 
argued that the international community’s recognition of Bosnia 
violated international law.135  The Court sidestepped Yugoslavia’s 
objections, and found that they had “jurisdiction independent of 
Bosnia’s legal soundness as a state.”136  Unsurprisingly, 
Yugoslavia’s appointed judge ad hoc, Milenko Kreca, dissented on 
the grounds that Bosnia was not truly a state and that the 
international community’s recognition of Bosnia was illegal, 
following Yugoslavia’s arguments.137 
Judge Kreca argued that the international community had 
adopted the constitutive view of recognition in its approach to 
Bosnia, violating what he argued was the accepted norm, the 
declaratory view.138  In his view, by recognizing Bosnia, the 
international community was actually attempting to turn it into a 
state, violating the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and 
impermissibly interfering in Bosnia’s internal affairs.139  Kreca 
 
130 Rich, supra note 47, at 50. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 56. 
133 Id. at 51 (quoting President Izetbegovic (quoted in ABC NEWS, May 5, 
1992)). 
134 Thomas D. Grant, Comment, Territorial Status, Recognition, and Statehood: 
Some Aspects of the Genocide Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 33 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 305, 306 (1997). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 309. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 326. 
139 Id. at 328. 
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further suggested that, without external aid, Bosnia could not have 
survived; it was only foreign military intervention that allowed 
Bosnia to actually function as a state.140  At the time recognition 
was granted, the international community envisioned, and later 
put in place, a long-term military presence to maintain Bosnia as a 
state.141  Thus, at the time of recognition, Bosnia was not clearly a 
viable independent state, and, in Judge Kreca’s mind, recognition 
was illegally constitutive and disruptive of Yugoslavia’s internal 
affairs. 
The argument that the international community had adopted 
the constitutive theory when it recognized Bosnia is simple word 
play.  States did not necessarily think that they were constructing a 
state through recognition, or even that recognition was an essential 
element of Bosnia’s statehood.  They might just as well have 
thought that recognition would help Bosnia attain the other 
attributes necessary for statehood, or that it would help Bosnia, 
having already fulfilled the requirements for statehood, maintain 
itself as a state.  The recognition decisions could simply be viewed 
as reflecting a low standard for the requirements for statehood, in 
which case the decision would serve simply as an 
acknowledgment of statehood, consistent with the declaratory 
theory.  Judge Kreca and Yugoslavia’s general point, however, 
seems valid: these recognition decisions clearly required little 
effective control on the part of the state, and cast doubt on whether 
there is a real effective prohibition against “premature” 
recognition, or that the standards for “premature” recognition are 
ever actually met. 
In the case of Bosnia, and to a lesser extent Croatia, the 
international community recognized entities that were considered 
illegal secessionist entities by their parent states; that were engaged 
in fierce military conflict against their parent states in the midst of 
their own “territory;” that were not in control of significant 
portions of their territory; and that were essentially reliant on 
external aid, including significant military support, for their 
continued existence as states.  In recognizing Bosnia and Croatia, 
the international community was recognizing extremely weak 
entities as states, against the protest of their parent state, at least 
partially as a means to ensure their survival as independent 
 
140 Id. at 329–30. 
141 Id. at 332. 
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entities.  The cases of Bosnia and Croatia thus suggest that a 
prohibition against “premature” recognition may not be a strong, 
or perhaps even weak, principle of international law. 
Alternatively, the “premature” recognition of Croatia and 
Bosnia may have been justified by the specific situation in 
Yugoslavia; that is, while there is a general prohibition against 
“premature recognition” in international law and practice, the 
prohibition falls away under certain circumstances, specifically, if 
the parent state is engaged in human rights abuses.  In the case of 
Yugoslavia, the federal government’s record on human rights was 
atrocious, with the Serb-controlled government engaging in a 
strategy of ethnic cleansing that amounted to genocide.142  Given 
its behavior, the claims of the central government for respect for its 
territorial integrity and non-interference in its internal affairs ring 
somewhat hollow.  It may be that the federal government was seen 
to have forfeited its rights to make these claims. 
While this forfeiture principle may not be explicit in 
international law,143 in the context of secession, a similar idea has at 
least been implied.  The 1970 United Nations Declaration on 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations was designed to encourage 
decolonization, while simultaneously making it clear that any 
“right of self-determination of peoples” was primarily applicable 
in the context of decolonization.144  But it also “hinted at the 
possibility that established states might forfeit their right to 
territorial integrity if they abused the rights of minorities,”145 when 
it announced that: 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would 
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
 
142 See Raymond Detrez, The Right to Self-Determination and Secession in 
Yugoslavia: A Hornets’ Nest of Inconsistencies, in CONTEXTUALIZING SECESSION: 
NORMATIVE STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 122 (describing 
the international sympathy the Bosniaks received as a result of “policies of ethnic 
cleansing and other atrocities”). 
143 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES, § 202 (1987) (making no mention of such an exception to the rule against 
premature recognition). 
144 Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-
Separatist Claims, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 41 (1998). 
145 Id. at 42. 
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integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent 
States conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples . . . and thus possessed of a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory 
without distinction as to race, creed, or colour.146 
Such a statement leaves room to wonder what happens to the 
territorial integrity of a state that fails to respect the equal rights of 
its people.  In the case of Yugoslavia, the crimes of the state went 
far beyond treating its people unequally, to the point of genocide, 
leaving its claim to territorial integrity in doubt. 
The limitation on territorial integrity inherent in the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations is subject to two interpretations 
given its origin in decolonization: either the parent state loses its 
right to territorial integrity as a general matter as a result of its bad 
behavior, or the parent state loses its right to territorial integrity 
only over the areas in which the violations of equal rights occur.  
This first understanding is fully consistent with the sanction theory 
of recognition: while the parent state’s bad behavior justifies 
recognition of the secessionist entity, there need be no nexus 
between the bad behavior and the territory or people of the 
secessionist entity.  The second understanding, on the other hand, 
is not fully consistent with the sanction theory: it would vitiate the 
parent state’s claim to territorial integrity only in regards to 
secessionist entities that the parent state had abused, and so would 
allow recognition of only such abused entities to serve as a 
sanction for the parent state’s bad behavior. 
More recent pronouncements have suggested that it is the first 
understanding, compatible with the sanction theory and requiring 
no nexus between the bad behavior and the secessionist entity, 
which limits a state’s right to territorial integrity.  In 2006, the U.N. 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1674, reaffirming “the 
provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.”147  Paragraph 138 of the Outcome 
 
146 Id. at 42–43, (quoting the Declaration on Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
G.A. Res. 2625, at 340, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970)). 
147 S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006), available at http:// 
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Document acknowledges that “[e]ach individual State has the 
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”148  Paragraph 139 
acknowledges that “[t]he international community . . . has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and 
other peaceful means . . . to help to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.”149  However, “we are prepared to take collective 
action . . . should peaceful means be inadequate and national 
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.”150  That is, if a state fails to protect its people, armed 
intervention, a clear violation of territorial integrity, is permitted. 
The essential notions behind these commitments are that the 
parent state has a “responsibility” to protect its people and that the 
international community has a license to violate the territorial 
integrity of the parent state for the purpose of protecting the 
people when the state fails to fulfill its responsibility.  It is not just 
that the people have a right to be protected, but that the state has a 
responsibility to protect them.  When a state fails to protect, it 
forfeits its claim to territorial integrity.  It is the abdication of this 
responsibility, rather than the suffering of a particular secessionist 
entity, that is at the heart of this commitment.  This would be 
consistent with the sanction theory, which only advocates 
recognition in the wake of human rights abuses.  Additionally, 
there is a requirement that the international community must act to 
protect people from human rights abuses.  Under the sanction 
theory, that is exactly what the international community is doing 
when it recognizes a secessionist entity, whether or not the 
secessionist entity is the locus of the abuse.  The Outcome 
Document suggests that the state loses its right to territorial 
integrity to the degree that the international community must 
violate its territorial integrity to fulfill the state’s failed obligation 
to protect its citizens.  The international community’s actions are 
 
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8710.doc.htm. 
148 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/summit2005 
/documents.html. 
149 Id. ¶ 139. 
150 Id. 
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limited to actions that will protect the abused population, not to 
actions that have some direct spatial relation to the abuse. 
This broader loss of territorial integrity is essential, at least in 
armed intervention, to effectively protect the victims of abuse.  If 
parent state A is launching missiles into territory B from various 
parts of the country, an armed intervention that simply sends 
troops into B, and does not further violate the territorial integrity of 
A, will be ineffective.  In order to protect the people of B, it will be 
necessary for the armed intervention to target the sites throughout 
A’s territory from which the missiles are launched.  Stopping the 
abuse will involve a violation of A’s territorial integrity as a 
whole—not just as to B, the precise target of the missiles.  The 
justification for violating the state’s territorial integrity is that 
doing so will stop the abuse; thus the state’s territorial integrity is 
forfeited to the degree necessary to end the abuse. 
The notion of general applicability is also consistent with the 
nature of other sanctions, such as political and economic ones.  
Political and economic sanctions are designed to deter bad 
behavior, and it is this bad behavior that justifies their imposition.  
Presumably, if they were not so justified, their imposition, like 
“premature” recognition, would constitute “an improper 
interference in the internal affairs of the parent state.”151  But 
having been justified by human rights abuses, they are limited not 
to a particular area or a particular issue.  Instead, they are limited 
by their purpose:  to end such abuse.  Economic sanctions need not 
be tailored to a particular geographic region or a particular abusive 
economic sector, but only to deterring bad behavior.  Thus the 
limitation on territorial integrity, seemingly inherent in the 
Outcome Document and essential for the full operation of the 
sanction theory of recognition, is consistent with the general 
approach to responding to human rights abuses. 
The case of Yugoslavia also lends support to the notion that a 
parent state’s bad behavior leaves its territorial integrity 
jeopardized generally, and not just as to the territory in which the 
abuse occurs.  While Yugoslavia had committed numerous human 
rights abuses, they occurred primarily within the territory of 
 
151 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 
202 cmt. f (1987). 
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Bosnia and Kosovo, and not in Slovenia and Macedonia.152  
Nevertheless, despite the protests of the central Yugoslavian 
government that recognition of any entity within its territory 
would violate its territorial integrity, the international community 
signaled its willingness to consider for recognition, and eventually 
recognized, both Slovenia and Macedonia.153  The cases of Slovenia 
and Macedonia suggest that Yugoslavia’s bad behavior nullified its 
right to territorial integrity generally, and not only with respect to 
the territory in which its bad behavior had occurred. 
On a related note, Lea Brilmayer has argued that secessionist 
entities 
cannot be . . . evaluated without reference to claims to 
territory . . . . When a group seeks to secede, it is claiming a 
right to a particular piece of land, and one must necessarily 
inquire into why it is entitled to that particular piece of 
land, as opposed to some other piece of land—or to no land 
at all.154 
While in the general case, this may involve an evaluation of the 
group’s “historical claim” to territory and numerous other 
factors,155 the outcome of such an evaluation should not be 
determinative when the parent state is in the process of abusing 
human rights.  In such cases, where the sanction theory 
recommends recognition, the secessionist entity’s right to the land 
it is receiving need not be grounded on its own merits, but rather 
on the fact that the parent state’s bad behavior has cost it the right 
to territorial integrity.  In cases where the sanction theory 
recommends recognition, the secessionist entity’s right to the land 
derives from the fact that the parent state, through its bad acts, has 
forfeited its right to the land, and the secessionist entity has earned 
it because recognizing the secessionist entity will serve as an 
effective sanction against the parent state, and not make the world 
worse off. 
 
152 See Detrez, supra note 142, at 122 (discussing the reasons for giving 
particular groups in the former Yugoslavia the right to national self-determination 
and secession). 
153 See supra Section 3.2 (describing the process by which Slovenia and 
Macedonia were recognized by the international community). 
154 Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 
16 YALE J. INT’L L. 177, 201 (1991). 
155 Id. at 199. 
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Similarly, while the principle of uti possiditis generally 
constrains the recognition of secessionist entities by limiting 
recognition to secessionist entities along previously established 
territorial lines,156 such considerations should be rejected in the 
case of a badly-behaved parent state.  Some have argued that the 
doctrine is inapplicable to internal borders or to turning any non-
international border into an international border, unless there is an 
international agreement or treaty stipulating that the principle be 
applied.157  Even if the doctrine is applicable generally, it seems 
clear that if the human rights abuses of the parent state can justify 
armed intervention and other violations of territorial integrity, 
then they should also be able to justify the redrawing of interior 
boundary lines, which are frequently “arbitrarily drawn.”158  Just 
as a badly-behaved state loses its right to territorial integrity in a 
general sense, such a state should also lose any right to set interior 
boundaries that constrain recognition by the international 
community. 
The international community is certainly familiar with the 
notion of redrawing internal boundaries in the formation of new 
state boundaries when states are guilty of human rights abuses, 
most notably in the case of post-World War II West and East 
Germany.  And the standard in current practice seems to be subject 
to modification.  The European Community claimed to apply the 
principle of uti possiditis in recognizing new states emerging from 
Yugoslavia.159  During the initial round of recognition decisions, 
Kosovo was denied recognition perhaps in part because it was 
merely a “former autonomous province” and not one of 
Yugoslavia’s “federal units.”160  But, as will be discussed infra, 
Kosovo eventually gained recognition, reflecting either a lowering 
 
156 See Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination and Secession Under International Law, 
29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 305, 313 (2001) (arguing that the principle of uti 
possiditis should be inapplicable when certain preconditions, like pre-agreements 
on border, are not met). 
157 See Peter Radan, Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of 
the Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 50, 58–65 
(2000) (arguing that the principle of uti possiditis is not, as claimed by the Badinter 
Commission, recognized as a general principle applicable to all cases of 
independence). 
158 See Halim Moris, Self-Determination: An Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric?, 
4 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 201, 214 (1997) (discussing self-determination 
arguments in favor of secession). 
159 Nanda, supra note 156, at 312. 
160 Rich, supra note 47, at 61. 
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of the standards of the boundaries necessary under the doctrine of 
uti possiditis or perhaps a notion that uti possiditis ceases to apply in 
the face of a badly-behaved parent state.  If uti possiditis ceases to 
apply for badly-behaved states, then the sanction theory operates 
in harmony with this principle.  If, however, uti possiditis operates 
generally, but with flexible standards, the sanction theory merely 
requires that international law lower its standards for 
administrative boundaries—for instance to the level of a 
conglomeration of townships, rather than provinces—when 
confronted with badly-behaving states. 
International law and practice thus reflect either that there is no 
true prohibition against “premature” recognition or that the 
territorial integrity-based objections underlying the rule against 
“premature” recognition fall away in the case of states that commit 
human rights abuses, allowing “premature” recognition to the 
degree that it is calculated to deter such abuses, considerations that 
seem equally applicable to the principle of uti possiditis.  Either 
stance on “premature” recognition is compatible with the sanction 
theory of recognition, which advocates recognition of secessionist 
entities only in the face of human rights violations by the parent 
state where it can be argued that the parent state has forfeited its 
right to territorial integrity and non-interference through its bad 
acts.  International law and practice on territorial integrity thus 
appear to do little to constrain the sanction theory of recognition; 
to the degree that they do so, they should be moved in a direction 
that does not limit the international community’s use of this 
powerful tool for enforcing good behavior. 
3.4. Alternative Theories of Recognition 
In cases where parent states have not committed human rights 
abuses, in cases where the circumstances are such that recognition 
would not serve as an effective sanction, or in cases where the 
parent state has acquiesced to a secessionist movement, the 
sanction theory of recognition would not provide grounds for 
recognition.  Instead, all of these cases could be met with non-
recognition or could be governed by an alternative theory 
providing guidance for recognition decisions in such situations.  In 
these types of cases, the sanction theory is indifferent as to how 
states choose to make their recognition decisions. 
In cases where the parent state has committed abuse, and 
where recognition of a secessionist entity would effectively 
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sanction the parent state without making the world worse off, the 
sanction theory will conflict with any alternative theories that 
counsel non-recognition.  Thus, the sanction theory requires that 
these theories be rejected in such cases.  By focusing primarily on 
the secessionist entity and not on the parent state, these alternative 
theories allow the parent state to violate human rights with 
impunity, knowing that recognition of the secessionist movement 
will not be granted, no matter how bad the parent state’s behavior.  
Whether constructed with the declaratory or constitutive theory in 
mind, these additional requirements blunt the effectiveness of 
recognition as a sanction again human rights abuses, eliminating 
one of the few tools that the international community has to deter 
such behavior. 
The most straightforward alternative theories are based on the 
declaratory model’s notion that recognition should be granted if 
and only if an entity meets the requirements of statehood.161  As 
discussed above, the most frequently cited outlines for these 
requirements are those put forth in the Montevideo Convention.162  
If those requirements are adopted, along with the declaratory 
model’s notion that states must recognize all entities that meet the 
requirements for statehood, we are left with a theory that suggests 
that all entities that meet the Montevideo Convention 
requirements, and only such entities, should be granted 
recognition. 
While territory and population are clearly necessary for the 
secessionist entity to even qualify as an “entity,” requiring more 
than a potential government with some degree of effective control 
ties the hands of the international community.  If more is required 
of the secessionist entity the parent state can continue its abuse, 
knowing that the international community is prohibited from 
granting recognition to the secessionist entity in an attempt to stop 
the bad behavior.  This view thus seems to ignore the reality of the 
situation:  that the international community has very few tools at 
its disposal for deterring bad behavior.  Given the importance of 
deterring states from violating human rights, and given the 
scarcity of deterrence methods, the international community 
should not bind itself to recognizing only states in complete 
 
161 See GRANT, supra note 12, at 4 (“When the attributes which international 
law holds to define a state come to obtain within a community, existing states 
should declare that fact by according the community recognition.”). 
162 Montevideo Convention, supra note 3. 
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“effective control.”  Instead, all that should be necessary is that the 
secessionist entity be capable of potentially controlling its territory 
after recognition is granted, and not be the type of entity whose 
recognition will lead to negative consequences greater than the 
positive consequences brought about by the sanction effects of 
recognition. 
From a practical perspective, requiring effective control not 
only allows abusive parent states to continue their bad behavior in 
certain situations, but it also creates strong incentives for all states 
to prevent internal entities from possessing anything approaching 
effective control.  This would lead states to avoid, for instance, the 
creation of autonomous units within themselves or the delegation 
of authority to local administrations, which seems, on the whole, to 
be a significantly negative consequence.163  The sanction theory, on 
the other hand, would not change the incentives for such political 
arrangements, but would cabin itself to providing incentives for 
the parent state not to commit human rights abuses. 
Other theories place additional requirements, beyond 
statehood, on secessionist entities for the granting of recognition.  
Because these alternatives make recognition, and even the threat of 
recognition, unavailable in certain circumstances where the parent 
state is committing human rights abuses, these theories impair the 
efficacy of recognition as a potential sanction and should be 
rejected.  One theory, somewhat similar to the Montevideo 
requirements, is the notion that only federal units should be 
granted recognition.164  Seemingly drawing its strength from a 
preference for maintaining territorial integrity165 (odd, given that 
recognition of even a federal entity is disrupting the territorial 
integrity of the parent state), this view that federal boundaries 
should be maintained, seems, for a time, to have driven the non-
recognition of Kosovo as a state, as discussed above.166  In addition 
to providing states with incentives to avoid federalization,167 this 
 
163 See Allen Buchanan, Theories of Secession, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 43–44 
(1997) (arguing against any theories of secession that dispose states to act in ways 
that preclude potentially beneficial decentralization). 
164 See GRANT, supra note 12, at 91 (noting that federal units generally have an 
easier time securing self-determination, in the face of the territorial integrity 
principles, than other pieces of the parent state). 
165 Id. 
166 See supra Section 3.3. 
167 Buchanan, supra note 163, at 43–44. 
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requirement dulls the power of recognition as a sanction and 
suffers from a significant case of moral randomness. 
Other requirements should be rejected for similar reasons.  
Crawford has proposed, as a criterion for statehood, a requirement 
that appears to be better stated as a condition for recognition:  that 
the new entity be independent in the sense that it was not formed 
“under belligerent occupation,” is not under “substantial external 
control,” and does not suffer from “[s]ubstantial illegality of 
origin.”168  Secessionist entities are considered to be illegal in origin 
under this theory if they arise: 
outside of the accepted rules of international law, 
particularly in regards to the use of force . . . in violation of 
a colonial entity’s right to self-determination . . . without 
the consent of the existing sovereign state . . . [or are] based 
fundamentally on the denial of certain civil and political 
rights to the large majority of its population . . . .169 
In a similar vein, Sunstein and Amar have each proposed 
restrictions on recognition based on a notion that secession must be 
legal under the constitutional or local law of the parent state.170 
While these restrictions may be worthwhile for crafting a 
general theory of secession, they should be rejected in the context 
of parent states that are committing human rights abuses.  As with 
other requirements, they reduce the effectiveness of recognition as 
a sanction by making it unavailable in certain situations, leaving 
the parent state’s behavior uncontrolled.  Further, while many of 
the norms behind these requirements may have strong pull in 
other contexts, they lose much of their force when the parent state 
is committing human rights abuses:  the consent of the parent state 
and respect for the constitutional or local law of the parent state 
seem particularly inapposite, as does concern for the right to self-
determination of a colonial entity that is engaging in serious 
human rights abuses.  At least some external control also seems 
forgivable in the sense that the alternative is to leave the 
secessionist entity under the control of an abusive state.  The same 
could be said for allowing the secessionist entity to have arisen 
 
168 Grant, supra note 39, at 437. 
169 PEGG, supra note 40, at 48. 
170 See Grant, supra note 134, at 316 (attributing Sunstein and Amar’s 
proposed requirement to the “special U.S. concern for the written constitution”). 
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through some degree of violation of international law, given that 
refusing to recognize the secessionist entity will leave it under the 
control of a parent state with a proven record of violating 
international law itself. 
Others have argued that the right to secession and 
independence, and presumably the right to recognition, hinges on 
advancing “national self-determination.”171  Under these theories, 
“political and cultural (or ethnic) boundaries must, as a matter of 
right, coincide.”172  Regardless of the justification for such a theory 
in other contexts, it should be rejected as an additional criterion for 
recognition when utilized as a sanction.  Such a requirement would 
reduce the effectiveness of the sanction, and would insulate the 
parent state from punitive recognition whenever the secessionist 
entities within its borders were either nationally diverse or merely 
an incomplete subset of a particular nationality within the parent 
state.  There are numerous existing states that are nationally 
heterogeneous, or which contain only a fraction of a particular 
nationality, and, in the face of the parent state’s bad behavior, there 
is nothing inherently wrong with recognizing one more. 
 Finally, democracy has been proposed as a requirement for 
the recognition of secessionist entities.173  While demanding 
evidence that the people of the secessionist entity actually desire to 
secede, as in the case of Bosnia,174 seems reasonable, demanding 
“proof of democratic institutions” seems unwise.  Such a 
requirement would disqualify secessionist entities from 
recognition and thus allow the parent state to continue its bad 
behavior with knowledge that, until the secessionist entity had 
gone through the arduous task of developing democratic 
institutions, the secessionist entity could not be recognized and 
thus the parent state could not be sanctioned.  Further, as with the 
requirements of local autonomy and federalization, a requirement 
of democracy could create incentives for parent states to avoid 
democracy both generally and at a local level to prevent 
 
171 See Margaret Moore, Introduction: The Self-Determination Principle and the 
Ethics of Secession, in NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 1, 7 (Margaret 
Moore ed., 1998) (providing an overview of this theory). 
172 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
173 See GRANT, supra note 12, at 94 (discussing how state practice has accreted 
a criterion of democracy to the prerequisites of statehood). 
174 See Lowe & Warbrick, supra note 103, at 434 (citing Bosnia as an example 
where “there was inadequate evidence that the people were in favour of 
independence”). 
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secessionist entities from building the capability to develop their 
own democratic institutions or transform the parent state’s 
democratic institutions into their own.175  While democracy is an 
excellent aspiration for the international community, in the context 
of parent states that commit human rights abuses, demanding it of 
secessionist entities seems to be a case of the best being the enemy 
of the good. 
Alternative theories may also require any number of factors in 
addition to recognition.  To the degree that they insulate a parent 
state from the sanction of recognition by making it impossible for a 
secessionist entity to be recognized, they should be resisted.  One 
instance of such a combination of requirements was the European 
Community’s “Declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of 
new States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,” discussed 
above.176  As their name suggests, of course, the Guidelines were 
not a general theory of recognition, but were crafted for a specific 
situation and were inherently tied up with a particular region and 
political situation.  Furthermore, they required not only that the 
secessionist entities be democratically constituted, but also that 
they accept “the appropriate international obligations,” commit 
themselves “to a peaceful process and to negotiations,”177 and meet 
a number of additional criteria:  demonstrate their “respect for the 
provisions” of the U.N. Charter and other international law 
documents;178 provide sufficient “guarantees for the rights of [ ] 
ethnic and national groups and minorities;”179 “respect [ ] the 
inviolability of all frontiers” and acknowledge that they could 
“only be changed by peaceful means and by common 
agreement;”180 commit to “disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation” as well as “security and regional stability;”181 and 
express their willingness to “settle by agreement, including . . . 
arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and regional 
 
175 See Buchanan, supra note 163, at 43 (generally discouraging any 
requirement that creates perverse incentives undermining morally sound 
principles of international law). 
176 See supra Section 3.2. 
177 Lowe & Warbrick, supra note 38, at 477 (quoting the Declaration of 
Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union). 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
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disputes.”182  In other pronouncements, the European Community 
also made it clear that the states had to accept “provisions on 
human rights suggested by the EC Conference on Yugoslavia and 
the continued work of the Conference and . . . the work of the 
Security Council in Yugoslavia,”183 and adopt “constitutional and 
political guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claim 
towards a neighboring Community State, including the use of 
language which implies territorial claims.”184 
While this laundry list of requirements might appear quite 
difficult to meet, in fact, most of the requirements required little 
more than commitments and promises.  The notion of conditioning 
recognition on promises extracted from the secessionist entity 
works perfectly well with the sanction theory to the extent that it is 
clear to all parties involved that the promises can be extracted.  
Given the desire of the secessionist entity to achieve recognition, 
they will have incentives to make the promises and conform to 
them, and the moment of recognition is an excellent time to extract 
such promises for the good of the international community and for 
the population of the secessionist entity.185  Further, as long as the 
parent state knows that the only promises that will be demanded 
of the secessionist entity are of the type that the secessionist entity 
is already willing to make without delay, then conditioning 
recognition on such promises will form no barrier to deterrence, 
and can simply increase the utility gained from the recognition 
decision by having it serve simultaneously as a deterrent and as a 
mechanism to encourage the secessionist entity to make positive 
commitments.  As long as the secessionist entity can make the 
promises easily, the parent state will know that such requirements 
will not form an effective bar to recognition, and thus will not give 
the parent state license to commit human rights abuses for fear of 
recognition.  Any promises that would effectively disqualify 
secessionist entities from recognition, however, should be rejected, 
as they will simply serve to allow the parent state to continue its 
bad behavior.  Additionally, while requiring commitments like 
those laid out by the European Community is quite appealing, 
promises are, after all, only promises. 
 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 478. 
184 Id. 
185 BUCHANAN, supra note 3, at 170. 
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These theories all have much to say for themselves; in 
situations where the sanction theory does not apply, the 
international community may wish to adopt one of these 
alternatives, or some combination of them.  But in situations where 
the sanction theory recommends recognition, the international 
community should reject their added requirements.  The positive 
effects for human rights brought about by using recognition as a 
sanction are simply too weighty to be ignored. 
4. THE SANCTION THEORY IN USE 
4.1. Introduction 
In addition to providing a better way to think about 
recognition and its benefits to the international community, recent 
practice suggests that the sanction theory of recognition is 
becoming one of the standard modalities for the enforcement of 
human rights.  While recent practice is not inconsistent with other 
alternative theories, its consistency with the sanction theory 
provides evidence that the impulses behind this theory have come 
to influence the thinking of the international community.  In 
addition to the recognition of states in the former Yugoslavia, 
discussed above, which appears to have come in response to the 
central government’s mistreatment of its people,186 the recognition 
decisions in the cases of Somaliland, Chechnya, and Kosovo all 
lend support to this notion. 
4.2. Somaliland 
The Republic of Somaliland is a secessionist entity within the 
borders of Somalia.  During the colonial period, the Republic of 
Somaliland was a British colony, while the rest of modern-day 
Somalia constituted Somalia Italiana, an Italian colony.187  In June 
of 1960, Somaliland gained its independence from Britain, and was 
quickly recognized as a state by the United Nations.188  In July, 
Somaliland united with the newly independent Somalia Italiana to 
 
186 See supra Sections 3.2.–3.3. (examining the sanction theory via the 
recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia). 
187 Alison K. Eggers, Note, When Is a State a State? The Case for Recognition of 
Somaliland, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 211, 212 (2007). 
188 Id. 
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form the modern-day Somalia.189  Prior to colonization, Somaliland 
had a history “as a stable state,” something neither Somalia Italiana 
nor Somalia as a whole could claim.190  Almost immediately after 
unification, the people of Somaliland held a referendum in which 
they voted strongly against unification and for independence, but 
the referendum went unheeded.191 
Unified, “[n]orthern grievances against southern domination 
began appearing almost immediately . . . . [T]he south 
monopolized all the key political posts . . . . The centralization of 
government in Mogadishu [in the south] . . . meant that economic 
and political opportunities also became concentrated there. 
Additionally, the south provided the country’s flag, its 
constitution, and its national anthem.”192  When Siad Barre came to 
power in 1969, Somaliland’s fortunes “took a dramatic turn for the 
worse.”193  Somaliland “suffered from extensive and systematic 
human rights violations during Barre’s regime,”194 which lasted 
until early 1991.195 
In the eighteen years since Barre’s fall, Somalia has seen 
nothing but fighting and failed governments;196 its government has 
suffered a “complete collapse,”197 and it currently lacks any “sort of 
governmental structure.”198  Somaliland, on the other hand, has 
been “a comparative picture of stability and good governance.”199  
As for its eligibility for recognition, Somaliland “easily meets the 
criteria set forth by the Montevideo Convention,”200 including 
possessing a government in effective control of its territory and 
with the capacity to enter into foreign relations.201  Somaliland “has 
 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
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192 PEGG, supra note 40, at 88. 
193 Id. 
194 MICHAEL SCHOISWOHL, STATUS AND (HUMAN RIGHTS) OBLIGATIONS OF NON-
RECOGNIZED DE FACTO REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CASE OF ‘SOMALILAND’ 
163 (2004). 
195 PEGG, supra note 40, at 89–90. 
196 SCHOISWOHL, supra note 194, at 105–10. 
197 Robert D. Sloane, The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A 
Case Study of Tibet, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 107, 113 (2002). 
198 SCHOISWOHL, supra note 194, at 110. 
199 PEGG, supra note 40, at 90–91. 
200 Eggers, supra note 187, at 217. 
201 Id. at 217–19. 
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suffered from a distinct lack of external assistance” and its 
independence cannot be challenged.202  Somaliland’s government 
has “broad popular support,” albeit with “some opposition,” and it 
is structured in a democratic manner,203 under a constitution 
adopted democratically.204  Furthermore, “the government has 
undertaken considerable efforts to satisfy at least the minimum 
international human rights standards.”205 
Somaliland thus seems to meet most of the requirements 
proposed by the theories of recognition that focus on the intrinsic 
merits of the secessionist entity:  it meets the Montevideo 
Convention criteria, it is independent, it is democratically 
constituted, its boundaries were set in the past, and it has shown 
respect for at least a base level of human rights.  Moreover, the 
parent state from which it is attempting to secede can barely be 
called a state at all; more accurately, it is a power vacuum that 
remains in the wake of a state’s complete collapse.  Despite all this, 
Somaliland has not been recognized as an independent state.206  
“Just cause” and “just cause plus” theories of recognition also seem 
to suggest that recognition should be granted:  in addition to 
Somaliland’s commitment to basic human rights standards, it 
suffered decades of abuse at the hands of its parent state, followed 
by fifteen years in which the supposed parent state has fulfilled 
none of the requirements of a parent state.207 
Somaliland’s non-recognition, however, is completely 
consistent with the sanction theory of recognition.  The sanction 
theory recommends recognition when it would serve as an 
effective sanction for the bad behavior of a secessionist entity’s 
parent state.  But it is difficult, given Somalia’s complete collapse, 
even to talk about Somalia as a state at all; given its situation, it is 
certainly not the type of entity that can be sanctioned.  Somalia is 
incapable of doing anything, let alone being deterred (or punished, 
for that matter).  Furthermore, sanctioning Somalia would have no 
general deterrent effect, as states in similar situations are just as 
 
202 PEGG, supra note 40, at 96–97. 
203 Id. at 94. 
204 SCHOISWOHL, supra note 194, at 133–35. 
205 Id. at 136. 
206 PEGG, supra note 40, at 91. 
207 But see, SCHOISWOHL, supra note 194, at 163–64 (arguing that Somaliland no 
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inherently impossible to sanction.  The international community’s 
non-recognition of Somaliland is completely consistent with the 
sanction theory of recognition because recognizing Somaliland 
would not serve as an effective sanction. 
4.3. Chechnya 
The history of the relationship between Russia and Chechnya 
for the past 200 years is ugly, with violence rampant through 
Russia’s attempts first to colonize Chechnya, then to consolidate its 
control through various methods.208  Russia’s most horrendous 
behavior occurred under Stalin’s rule, when the entire population 
of Chechnya—over 400,000 Chechens—was forcibly removed by 
the Russian military.209  In addition to those killed for resisting or 
for being too “logistically complicated” to move, tens of thousands 
died during the “resettlement” process and over 100,000 died after 
being relocated.210  After Stalin’s death, the Chechens returned, and 
while tensions ran high between the Chechens and the Russians 
that had replaced them, they managed an “uneasy . . . co-
existence.”211 
As the Soviet Union was crumbling, Dzhokhar Dudaev was 
democratically elected President of Chechnya.  Upon his 
inauguration in November 1991, he declared Chechnya 
independent.212  While the Russian military briefly attempted to 
remove Dudaev from power, they failed to do so, and Russian 
troops vacated Chechnya.213  From then until 1994, Chechnya had 
“de facto” independence.214  In December of 1994, Russia attacked, 
leading to a twenty-month war with over 45,000 killed.215  Twenty-
seven thousand civilians were killed in Russian attacks on Grozny 
alone.216  Much of the Russian military action in Chechnya appears 
 
208 See generally TONY WOOD, CHECHNYA: THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENCE 19–39 
(2007) (outlining tragic historical events that confronted Chechens from the 
sixteenth century to the nineteenth with emphasis on Russian invasions). 
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to have been indiscriminate or specifically targeted at civilians.217  
Dudaev himself was far from a model leader,218 and the Chechens’ 
conduct in the war was far from exemplary.219  Nevertheless, the 
Chechens eventually defeated the Russians, and as of 1996, 
Chechnya was once again de facto independent.220  This 
independence was far from perfect, with widespread violence and 
corruption, but it lasted in full for three years, until 1999.221  Russia 
eventually invaded again, this time successfully taking power, but 
not without bombing marketplaces and lines of fleeing refugees, 
holding civilians in detention camps for torture and execution, and 
targeting civilians for various “barbaric acts.”222 
At no point during Chechnya’s various moments of de facto 
independence did another state recognize it as an independent 
state, with the exception of Afghanistan’s Taliban government.223  
Its de facto independence from 1991–1994, and to a lesser extent, its 
second de facto independence from 1996–1999, would seem to 
justify recognition under a Montevideo Convention-based theory 
of recognition.224  Recognizing Chechnya would also seem to be 
consistent with the goal of advancing self-determination.  And 
while the behavior of the Chechens in the war against Russia might 
disqualify it from recognition under a “just cause plus” theory of 
recognition, Russia’s indisputably worse behavior undoubtedly 
justified recognition under a simple “just cause” theory of 
recognition. 
The international community’s non-recognition of Chechnya, 
however, is completely consistent with the sanction theory of 
recognition.  The sanction theory only requires recognition when 
doing so would serve as an effective sanction for the bad behavior 
of the parent state, and where recognition would not make the 
world worse off.  Recognizing Chechnya, however, fails for two 
reasons:  it would not serve as an effective sanction, and it might 
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make the world worse off.  As for serving as an effective sanction, 
recognition can only be effective if the new state, once recognized, 
can remain independent of the parent state.  If the parent state can 
simply overrun the new state and reincorporate it into its own 
territory, then the recognition will have been in vain.  Given 
Russia’s success in regaining control of Chechnya following its 
second de facto independence, it seems unlikely that recognition, 
without foreign military aid, could have stopped Russia.  Similarly, 
given Russia’s aggressiveness and military power, it is unclear that 
even a significant foreign military presence in a newly recognized 
Chechnya could have kept it independent of Russia, and thereby 
made recognition an effective sanction. 
Furthermore, even if a large foreign military presence could 
have stopped Russia from quashing Chechnya’s independence, the 
likely result would have violated the requirement that the 
recognition decision not make the world worse off.  Not only 
would the recognition have raised the already high tensions 
between the West and Russia, a nuclear superpower, but it also 
would have likely led to significant and ongoing conflict between 
Russia and the foreign military presence that would be necessary 
to secure Chechnya’s independence.  Given these enormous 
consequences, and Chechnya’s own bad behavior, it seems 
unlikely that the possible deterrent effect achieved by recognition 
of Chechnya would be justified: it would likely make the world 
worse off. 
Thus, despite Russia’s bad behavior, the sanction theory of 
recognition would not have recommended recognition for 
Chechnya at any point.  Given Russia’s aggressiveness and 
military might, recognition of Chechnya would likely not have 
secured its independence, thereby negating the deterrent effect of 
recognition, as well as the subsidiary goal of incapacitating the 
parent state with regards to the secessionist entity.  Further, given 
the bloody conflict that would have likely ensued had the 
international community provided the requisite military support to 
keep Chechnya independent, and thus made recognition an 
effective deterrent, the negative consequences of recognizing 
Chechnya would likely have outweighed the positive sanction 
effects of recognizing Chechnya.  Therefore, the recognition 
decision would have made the world worse off.  As Russia remains 
aggressive and militarily powerful, it is unlikely that the sanction 
theory would ever recommend recognition of Chechnya, or any 
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secessionist entity within Russia’s borders, regardless of Russia’s 
bad behavior throughout its territory.225 
4.4. Kosovo 
For centuries, there has been conflict between the Kosovar 
Albanians and the Serbs, with the Serbs claiming that Kosovo is 
part of Serbia, and the Kosovar Albanians claiming a status as an 
independent nation.226  Nevertheless, the Kosovar Albanians were 
unable to gain recognition as an independent nation throughout 
the 20th century, and Kosovo was considered part of Yugoslavia.227  
When communist Yugoslavia was established in the wake of 
World War II, the Kosovar Albanians “were granted a degree of 
autonomy within Serbia.”228  Eventually, under Yugoslavia’s 1974 
constitution, Kosovo was granted “significant autonomy.  
Although it was technically still within Serbia, in reality the region 
was granted a status similar to that of the constituent republics of 
the federation.”229 
The Kosovar Albanians, however, desired the status of an 
actual republic, but their demands were met with violence and 
repression.230  Eventually, in 1989, Kosovo’s autonomy was 
extinguished, and its people were “exposed to massive abuse of 
their human rights and civil liberties.”231  After watching other 
secessionist entities within Yugoslavia gain recognition as states 
while its own requests for recognition went unheeded,232 in 1998, 
Kosovo turned to the Kosovo Liberation Army and guerilla 
 
225 Almost identical statements could be made about the international 
community’s continuing non-recognition of Tibet and Taiwan.  While China has 
committed human rights abuses throughout its territory, and many theories of 
recognition would impel the acknowledgment of Tibet and Taiwan as new states, 
the sanction theory would not counsel recognition.  Given China’s aggressiveness 
and military might, recognition would not serve as an effective sanction, and 
would likely make the world worse off. 
226 Agon Demjaha, The Kosovo conflict: A perspective from inside, in KOSOVO AND 
THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 32, 32–33 (Albrecht Schnabel & 
Ramesh Thakur eds., 2000). 
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warfare to attain independence.233  Serbia responded with ethnic 
cleansing,234 forcibly deporting over 800,000 Kosovar Albanians, 
murdering over 10,000, and raping many more.235  As a result of 
large-scale NATO air strikes and the threat of a ground invasion, 
Serbia eventually agreed to withdraw its troops from Kosovo and 
allow the U.N. to establish a “protectorate” there.236  Since that 
time, over 16,000 troops have attempted to keep the peace in 
Kosovo,237 although they have not been completely successful in 
stopping Kosovar Albanian reprisals against Serb civilians.238 
Kosovo was not immediately granted recognition in the wake 
of Serbia’s withdrawal.  Nevertheless, the Kosovar Albanians 
perceived that “NATO’s humanitarian intervention and the 
establishment of Kosovo as an international trusteeship in 
everything but name appeared to set the track for an inevitable 
move to independence.”239  After years of deadlock and dodging 
the question, the U.N. proposed a plan for an independent 
Kosovo.240  On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its 
independence,241 and while Serbia and many other states continue 
to contest its independence, by March 19, 2008, over 30 countries 
had recognized it as a new state.242 
Understanding the U.N. trusteeship as a long path towards 
recognition, Kosovo would likely have gone unrecognized under a 
Montevideo Convention-based theory of recognition:  without the 
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support of NATO and the U.N., Kosovo was unable to protect its 
people from Serbia’s military, and thus could not be said to have 
had a government that was in effective control of its territory.  On 
the other hand, Kosovo’s recognition is in line with “just cause” 
theories of recognition,243 although its violent origins and 
subsequent misbehavior toward Serb civilians might undermine its 
claim to recognition under a “just cause plus” theory of 
recognition. 
The sanction theory of recognition, however, would certainly 
recommend recognition of Kosovo.  In light of the international 
community’s earlier recognitions of Bosnia, Macedonia, Slovenia, 
and Croatia, opposed by Serbia and discussed above,244 the 
international community was fully cognizant of its ability to 
effectively sanction Serbia through recognition; it was fully capable 
of effectively guaranteeing the independence of newly recognized 
states in the face of Serbian opposition.  Further, Serbia’s atrocious 
human rights abuses were exactly the type of behavior that the 
sanction theory of recognition is designed to deter. 
The recognition of Kosovo can be understood as a sanction for 
Serbia’s bad behavior not only in Kosovo, but also for Serbia’s 
earlier bad behavior in Bosnia and Croatia.  Recognizing Kosovo 
can also be understood as a sanction not only for bad behavior qua 
bad behavior, but also as a sanction for bad behavior insofar as it 
represented a willful refusal to reform.  Under the sanction theory, 
the international community’s recognition of Bosnia, Croatia, 
Slovenia, and Macedonia was a signal for Serbia to reform its bad 
behavior.  In ignoring this signal by engaging in further human 
rights abuses in Kosovo, Serbia’s bad behavior amounted to 
flouting the international community’s demand that it reform its 
behavior and threatened to undermine the general deterrent power 
of the sanction theory of recognition.  Thus, the recognition of 
Kosovo is consistent not only with the sanction theory of 
recognition generally, but also with a desire to protect the efficacy 
of the sanction theory as a tool for combating human rights abuses. 
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 5. CONCLUSION 
The cases of Somaliland, Chechnya, Kosovo, and the other 
secessionist entities discussed throughout this Article are not 
intended to prove that the sanction theory of recognition has been 
expressly adopted by the international community.  Instead, they 
simply show that the international community has behaved in 
ways that are quite consistent with the sanction theory of 
recognition in many cases, and that many of the considerations 
driving the sanction theory of recognition appear to be driving the 
actual recognition decisions made by the international community.  
In addition to these cases, international practice and international 
law appear to be generally compatible with the adoption of the 
sanction theory of recognition with only minor modification. 
Given this consistency with law and practice, the sanction 
theory of recognition should be adopted by the international 
community.  In those cases where a parent state has committed 
human rights abuses, and recognition of a secessionist entity 
would serve as an effective sanction without making the world 
worse off, intrinsic considerations should be put aside and 
recognition should be granted.  The international community is 
justified in harming the interests of the parent state and violating 
its territorial integrity in such cases because the parent state has 
violated its essential obligations as a state and thus forfeited its 
right to object.  More fundamentally, the international community 
is justified in adopting the sanction theory of recognition because 
its returns are so great.  The international community has very few 
tools at its disposal for enforcing good human rights behavior on 
the part of states.  The sanction theory, by shifting the focus of 
recognition decisions from the intrinsic merits of the secessionist 
entity to the bad behavior of the parent state, while rejecting any 
requirement of a nexus between the bad behavior and the 
secessionist entity, maximizes the benefits that can be achieved 
through recognition, and transforms recognition into a powerful 
tool to combat human rights abuses. 
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